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 I. INTRODUCTION, OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGY 
 Family relationships are both a source of profound satisfaction, and a source of 
profound challenges for Ontarians.  All family relationships end eventually, and it is not 
always death which does them part. At least 40% of intimate relationships between 
adults are eventually terminated by the choice of one or both parties.1  Some intimate 
relationships dissolve painlessly. Many others, however, create serious challenges 
when they end, both for the individuals involved and for Ontario as a whole. From the 
province’s point of view, these family challenges can be analogized to a public health 
problem.  The malady in question is not generally fatal, but it is certainly widespread.2  
 This paper considers first the problem, then the prevention, and finally the 
treatment. In so doing, it deploys cost-benefit and economic lenses as analytical tools. 
This paper has been prepared for the family law procedure project currently being 
conducted by the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO). The LCO’s work will also draw 
together research on interdisciplinarity in the legal profession and the results of a broad 
public consultation with Ontarians.  This paper will refer to the findings from these 
consultations, and seek to relate them to the existing scholarly literature. This paper 
also includes tentative reform recommendations where they seem to be justified by the 
research.3 
 Part I of this paper defines the phrase “family challenges” and introduces cost-
benefit analysis, with a focus on its potential and its limitations within this field of inquiry.  
Part II identifies three sources of family challenges: (i) the economic vulnerability of 
Canadian families, (ii) sacrifices in earning potential during family life, and (iii) conflict 
arising upon relationship breakdown.  Part III turns to mechanisms by which the 
province might prevent family challenges, either by preventing relationship breakdown 
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 or by preventing the challenges which arise upon breakdown.  In Part IV, the paper 
turns to government responses to family challenges.  Section IV.A is about increasing 
the legal information and services, and identifying the costs and benefits of alternative 
dispute resolution and litigation.  Section IV.B analyzes the potential of administrative, 
state-driven responses to family challenges.  Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
I. A. Subject Matter: the Families and the Challenges Under Examination 
Here 
 Sociologists, psychologists, and public policy experts have all proposed 
definitions of the word “family.”4  “Family law,” as the subject is taught in Canadian law 
schools and classified in case digests, may include issues such as child protection and 
assisted reproduction law.  This paper, however, focuses on families which involve 
intimate or “conjugal” relationships between adults.  This includes same-sex and non-
marital relationships and relationships which do not produce children. The focus of this 
paper is the challenges faced by these families and their individual members after the 
adult cohabitation ceases.  However the roots of these post-cohabitation challenges 
must be traced to the experience of the family members during cohabitation.  
 This paper encompasses neither families which never involved an intimate 
relationship between adults, nor families in which the intimate inter-adult relationship 
never dissolved. The rationale for this limitation of scope is that there is a distinct set of 
challenges posed by the dissolution of intimate relationships between adults. These 
challenges are those discussed in sections II.B and II.C – sacrifices in earning potential 
and interpersonal conflict arising on relationship breakdown. Other families -- the family 
involved in a child protection proceeding, the family seeking access to artificial 
reproduction technologies, the single parent seeking to support an adopted child -- face 
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 a distinct set of challenges. Because the time and space available do not permit a 
thorough treatment of this second set of challenges, they must be left for another paper. 
I. B. Unit of Analysis: Individual or Family? 
 This paper will consider the welfare and interests of Ontarians who were 
members of families, while seeking to simultaneously keep in view the interests of 
families as units.  Our family law and our dispute resolution system currently focus on 
the individual rights and obligations of family members.  To some extent, this is an 
inevitable consequence of our law’s aspiration to protect the interests of (i) people who 
no longer wish to cohabit, and (ii) individuals whose intimate relationships have been 
terminated by the other party.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has 
arguably helped entrench the individualism of Canadian family law.5  
  However, it is also possible to think creatively about protecting the interests of 
family units, even when those families appear to be disintegrating.  At least if children 
are present, dispute resolution can be conceived not as the end of a family but rather as 
a reconfiguration of a family.6 The law aspires to preserve a child’s relationships with 
both parents in most cases.7  Therefore, parents often do not or can not entirely 
disentangle their lives for as long as their child or children remain below the age of 
majority. This may require family law process to consider the emotional health of the 
parents, and the need to support a modified, post-cohabitation “family.”8  Doing so can 
make the adults into better parents, which supports the law’s overriding goal in 
parenting litigation of upholding the best interests of the child.9 
 There is some precedent in the literature for a focus on families as units.  There 
is also an ongoing popular and scholarly debate about whether or marriage is itself “in 
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 decline.”10 The focus of interest in this debate is not so much the well-being of the 
individuals within families as it is the well-being of the families as units.  The case for 
triage or differentiated case management is largely based on the idea that different 
families (as opposed to different individuals) are best served by different services and 
dispute-resolution approaches.11  The costs and benefits of focusing on family units 
versus individuals awaits a fuller exploration, but the literature does provide a basis to 
explore this intriguing possibility.  The interests of broader communities and of Ontario 
as a whole may be correlated with a progressive and therapeutic response to family 
units in crisis.  This paper will, whenever possible, seek to incorporate both the 
individual and the family as units of analysis. 
I. C. The role of choice in the formation of family 
 Different scholarly perspectives have come to different conclusions about the role 
of choice within the formation of the family.  To some extent, intimate conjugal 
relationships may be understood as voluntary, contractual arrangements established by 
consenting adults for mutual benefit.  The mutual benefit is psychological but also 
financial, insofar as cohabiting and sharing expenses can raise the material standard of 
living for both parties. 
 Alternatively, these relationships may be sites of coercion and power.12  Meg 
Luxton, for example, suggests that  
women’s primary responsibility for domestic labour, and particularly 
childcare and other caregiving responsibilities, is central to women’s 
economic dependency on men … the nuclear family form results in 
women doing vast amounts of socially necessary labour for free and in 
ways that are not recognized or validated socially.13 
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  Choice is also a central issue in the debate about distinctions between 
cohabitation and marriage.  Some scholars argue that the law should not make 
distinctions between couples who have cohabited for extended periods and couples 
who married.14  Others reply that the choice to marry or not marry is a significant one, 
from which private family law consequences may legitimately follow.15  Another line of 
critical inquiry focuses on the concept of “conjugality,” and queries whether the law 
should distinguish between those whose cohabitation is “conjugal” and those whose 
cohabitation is not.16   
 Marriage itself and its historical development have been widely explored in the 
sociological literature.  Ernest Burgess argued in 1945 that, near the beginning of the 
20th century, a transformation had occurred in the United States from “institutional 
marriage” to “companionate marriage.”17  Whereas the former type of marriage was a 
“building block of society” and regulated by social norms, the latter was fundamentally 
defined by the affective bonds between the parties and by their choice of each other.  
John Amato and his colleagues have suggested that this trend continued into the post-
war period:  
As men and women gained greater freedom to engage in multiple 
sexual relationships before marriage, marry whomever they pleased, 
negotiate their own marital roles, and leave unsatisfactory unions, 
people came to focus increasingly on whether potential spouses would 
be good companions, emotionally supportive mates, and satisfying 
sexual partners.18 
 This development appears to have elevated the importance of individual choice 
in the formation intimate relationships. Andrew Cherlin argued in 2004 that a second 
transformation had subsequently occurred, towards “individualized marriage, in which 
the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded.”19  Amato et al 
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 suggested in their 2007 book that “we may be witnessing a shift toward a new view of 
marriage that values the institutional basis of marriage but also recognizes the 
importance of companionate and individualistic elements – a form of marriage in which 
individual happiness and obligations to the larger society are in balance.”20  
 In a diverse and multicultural jurisdiction like Ontario, it is likely that the nature of 
intimate relationships, and the extent to which they are the products of choice or 
coercion, are highly dependent on the values and cultural background which the parties 
bring into them.  Kerry Daly’s comments about “parenting culture” might be equally 
applicable to the influence of culture on decisions about family relationships generally: 
Culture consists of an ever changing constellation of meanings and 
practices, that provides a means for examining the flow of family 
experience within context … In our everyday lived experience, culture is 
usually hidden from view, because it is so familiar and so deeply 
embedded in our habits and routines. For parents, this often means that 
the everyday decisions of parenting are shaped by non-specific, 
background undercurrents that guide what seems right, natural or 
appropriate. Culture is paradoxical insofar as it is pervasive in 
everything we do but so often it is indecipherable. It is a case of the fish 
not being able to see the water in which it swims.21 
 To the extent that intimate relationships are the product of choices, to what 
extent are they economic choices?  It is generally thought that decision-making in 
intimate relationships and between family models is driven by emotional or cultural 
factors, rather than economic ones.  However, studies of the decision whether to marry 
have identified relevant economic incentives and disincentives to marriage.22  Pre-
marital and cohabitation contracts are entered into by at least some Canadians, and 
those who do so are clearly aware of the economic consequences of intimate 
relationships and their potential breakdown.23   
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 I. D. Evaluative Tool: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 This paper will seek to apply cost-benefit analytical tools to family challenges and 
our responses to them.  Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been defined as the  
Attemp[t] to place a dollar valuation on the outcomes of a program or 
intervention and to answer the question: How much is society willing to 
pay for the output of this program or what are the benefits to society of 
having this output?  The dollar valuation of this output or the benefits are 
then compared with the costs of producing it. If the benefits exceed the 
costs, the program is considered to be an efficient use of society's 
resources.24 
 CBA originally sought to identify “Pareto improvements,” which is to say changes 
in policy which would make at least one person better off without making anyone worse 
off.25 Following the work of Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, CBA came to accept that a 
change can be described as “efficient” even if someone is made worse off, provided that 
everyone would be better off if  the “winners” from the change were to compensate the 
“losers.” 26  CBA has been widely applied to the study of environmental and other 
regulation27 and to proposals for new government expenditure, for example in health 
care.28  However, it has also been criticized for inattentiveness to distributional 
questions and for its attempt to put a dollar value on human life or other things which 
should arguably be considered “priceless.”29 
 Formal cost-benefit analysis generally requires (i) a quantification of benefits and 
costs and (ii) an arithmetic comparison of them.  Often many of the numbers in the 
equation are speculative, insofar as they refer to an uncertain future or contra-factual 
situations.30  Even if they are real and have already been incurred, determining the true 
costs and benefits of public sector initiatives is very challenging. Regarding costs, the 
theoretical efforts of Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office and its counterparts are 
helpful.31  With regard to social benefits, the work of the Commission on the 
 9
 Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress led by economist Joseph 
Stiglitz is also useful.32   
 Assuming that costs and benefits can be quantified, cost-benefit analysis may be 
used to identify investments of public funds which will “pay for themselves” or produce 
benefits which exceed their costs in the long run.  For example, a recent report from the 
Ontario Association of Food Banks argued that poverty costs $10.4 billion to $13.1 
billion per year for the federal and provincial governments, or $2,299 to $2,895 per year 
per Ontarian household.33 This report divides the social cost of poverty into three 
components.  The "remedial costs" include governmental health care, crime-response, 
and social assistance expenditures which would not exist in the absence of poverty.  
The "intergenerational costs" are created by the inherited impediments and needs of 
children of poor families.  "Opportunity costs" are the provincial revenues which are lost 
because of citizens being less economically productive than they would be in the 
absence of poverty.34  
 Cost-benefit analysis is compatible with a variety of different choices about 
what’s important to us as a society. In the words of Cass Sunstein, CBA 
should not be seen as embodying a reductionist account of the good, 
and much less as a suggestion that everything is simply a “commodity” 
for human use.  It is best taken as pragmatic instrument, agnostic on the 
deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex 
judgments where multiple goods are involved.35 
CBA requires, and is not an alternative to, a conversation about our values as a society. 
This conversation is necessary in order to place dollar figures on the various outcomes 
of public policy options.  As an analytical technique, CBA is compatible with a variety of 
alternative schemes for valuing these outcomes, such as the Genuine Progress Index 
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 (GPI).  The GPI is an index of human progress which was designed as an alternative to 
more purely financial measures such as Gross Domestic Product or Gross National 
Product.36  Formulations of the GPI often include items such as “cost of family 
breakdown” and “value of non-paid household labour” which are directly relevant to any 
application of CBA to family policy issues.37 
I.D.1. Applying CBA Methodology to Family Challenges: Limitations 
 The methodological difficulty of quantifying speculative costs is particularly biting 
in the field of study under examination here. For example, a true cost-benefit analysis of 
the parent education program in Toronto’s Superior Court might have to determine how 
much further litigation would currently be occurring had the program never been put into 
place. The long-term impact of different procedures and interventions upon children is 
also little understood, largely due to the ethical challenges of scientifically controlled 
research on children.38   
 Assessing costs of family dispute resolution for the participants also requires 
looking outside of family law itself.  An example of this approach is Walking on 
Eggshells: Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's Welfare System, a report 
prepared by a multidisciplinary team in 2004.39  This report identified a nexus between 
family law disputes, social assistance, and domestic violence.  Ontario Works (the 
provincial social assistance system) is a means-tested program.  In order to be entitled, 
an applicant must show that he or she remains below a certain income level despite 
having made “reasonable efforts to obtain compensation or realize” all “financial 
resource[s] or income that the person may be entitled to or eligible for.”40  An applicant 
who is entitled to child support from a co-parent must therefore make efforts to obtain it.  
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 If the applicant has experienced domestic violence at the hands of this co-parent, then 
the obligation to pursue him or her for child support may create vulnerability to further 
violence.  The Ontario Works Policy Directives respond to this danger by providing that 
“individuals at risk of domestic violence are not expected to pursue support and may be 
granted a waiver.”41  However, the Walking on Eggshells authors reported that many 
individuals who would have benefitted from this waiver were unaware of it. Within their 
interview sample, only 2 out of 34 claimants who might have qualified for the waiver 
were even aware of its existence.42  One interviewee reported: 
I was told absolutely, that I had to go for child support even though I told 
them that it was a dangerous situation, they still said I had to do it if I 
wanted to receive benefits from them. And then they turned right around 
and said they were going to take it.43 
While this specific account cannot be corroborated, it is probably representative of the 
experience of at least some domestic violence victims.  The pressure to pursue child 
support faced by social assistance recipients is an example of a “cost” imposed by our 
family service delivery system and borne by an already vulnerable group.  However, it is 
very difficult to imagine how this cost might be quantified. 
 As discussed below, there is a substantial literature evaluating experiments and 
pilot projects in the family dispute resolution sphere. The value of these projects is most 
often measured in terms of the settlement rate – how many of the litigants withdrew 
from litigation after engaging in the initiative under study.  Settlement rates are a helpful 
indicator proxy for the benefits of a family process reform initiative, but a settlement 
might be exploitative or not durable. For this reason follow-up interviews and 
questionnaires with participants, asking for example how many would recommend a 
particular intervention, are a useful complement to settlement rates. 44  
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   These studies provide a basis for comparing the costs of specific types of ADR 
to the process costs of litigation, but they do not generally consider broader costs and 
benefits (including non-financial ones) to adults, to children, and to communities.  
Identifying these costs and benefits would be necessary in order to perform a formal 
CBA. The evaluation of Australia’s 2006 reforms conducted by Rae Kaspiew and her 
colleagues is extremely comprehensive and exceeds 400 pages in length, but even this 
thorough document is not able to perform a formal and quantified cost-benefit 
analysis.45 
 More broadly, it is not clear that one can ever quantify the value of intangibles 
such as preserving access to justice,46 cultivating forgiveness between the parties,47 or 
other costs and benefits offered by litigation and alternative responses to family 
challenges.  Nonetheless the literature has recognized that such items have a value 
which can be weighed against other values.  For example, the conclusion of McIntosh et 
al regarding Australia’s “Children’s Cases Program” pilot project was that  “a loss in 
apparent judicial impartiality amounted to a clear gain for many parents, who were more 
often reached, moved, and inspired by a judge who entered their struggle.”48   
I.D.2. Applying CBA to Family Challenges: Potential 
 Cost-benefit analysis in its formal and technical version has not often been 
applied to family law policy questions.49  However, there are a few interesting examples 
of less structured applications of similar, economically-oriented analytical tools to family 
challenges.  A 2009 submission to Ontario’s Attorney General argued for the funding of 
“Case Assessment Coordinators” and expanded mediation services in Ontario courts.50 
This argument was supported by an Appendix identifying the various cost components 
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 of implementing this proposal at one court. The Appendix also identified the cost of the 
proposal per case diverted from court.51  
 Even when the quantification required by formal CBA is impossible, costs and 
benefits are identified in a less technical way in family law policy debates. “Informal” 
CBA might simply mean focusing on costs and benefits of alternative responses to 
family challenges and using this thought process to generate reform ideas.  An example 
is found in the debate about whether the law should encourage more “equal” divisions 
of parenting time after a relationship ends.  It is a generally acknowledged benefit to 
children to have parenting arrangements which preserve meaningful relationships with 
both of their parents.52  However, inter-parental conflict is a generally acknowledged 
cost or detriment to children, especially if the children are aware of or observe that 
conflict.53  The effort to preserve relationships with both parents by ordering joint 
custody may often increase the level of conflict. Substantial debate continues about how 
to balance the benefit against the cost.  Scholars question whether reforms to 
strengthen children’s relationships with both parents post-separation (benefit) would 
increase conflict (cost) to the extent that there is a net detriment for the children.54 
II. FAMILY CHALLENGES  
 The challenges which Ontarians experience after family separation often have 
roots within the economic life of the intact family.  Ontario’s families are highly 
vulnerable to the economic challenges of relationship breakdown, due to low levels of 
savings and high household expenses relative to household income.  Individuals who 
have curtailed labour force participation in order to assume domestic responsibilities 
within a family face unique challenges if that family dissolves.  Whatever economic 
 14
 arrangements prevail within the intact family, some degree of conflict often 
accompanies the end of a relationship, and this is another major source of family 
challenges.  
 A recent case report tells the story of an Ontario couple who experienced many 
typical family challenges.55 The story of their relationship and its dissolution is told 
below.  Subsequent sections of this paper will make reference to this story, in order to 
illustrate the nature and impact of family challenges.   
 Ronald Peters and Beatrice Smith met in 1974, when both were 
employed by the federal government.  Beatrice was 18 years old at the 
time; Ron was 27 and had two children from a previous relationship.  
Three years later, Ron and Beatrice moved in together and began living 
as a couple. For the next 11 years, they lived together in various 
Canadian towns to which Ron was posted by the Canadian government.  
In 1988, they got married.  Ron soon received a promotion, becoming 
manager of workplace a small Ontario town.  
 Beatrice was still working in another office of the same federal 
ministry at the time. She fell afoul of the criminal law after taking 
financial advantage of her employer. She was convicted and 
incarcerated for theft, fraud, and forgery.  Although this development 
had an impact on both parties, their relationship survived the blow.  In 
1995 Ron and Beatrice moved south, to a larger city. They opened a 
small print and copy shop.  
 When they arrived in their new city, Beatrice was 40 years old and 
Ron was close to 50.  They had lived together for 18 years.  Although 
Beatrice’s criminal charge was still hanging over them unresolved, they 
established themselves in a new city and were probably optimistic about 
becoming entrepreneurs. They also had another reason for joy – 
Beatrice was pregnant with their first daughter, Sarah.  Sarah was born 
on Canada Day 1995. Her sister followed almost exactly three years to 
the day later -- June 30, 1998. 
 Ron and Beatrice devised a schedule to allow them to care for their 
infant daughters and their infant business at the same time.  Ron, who 
left the federal workforce after moving, cared for the babies from 
Monday to Friday while Beatrice staffed the business.  On the weekend, 
they would switch roles; with Beatrice at home and Ron dealing with the 
business.  Despite these diligent efforts, the store was never very 
successful. In 2006, a judge found that it was losing over $10,000 per 
year, and it subsequently became bankrupt. 
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  In June 2005, Beatrice suddenly moved out of the parties’ home.  
She apparently did so without any warning or prior announcement. 
However, she must have had her reasons for ending a 30 year 
relationship.   
 Despite -- or perhaps because of -- their many decades together and 
their two young children, the parties were unable to part company 
amicably. It may be that they had never been very happy; a judge later 
found an “undercurrent in the evidence of some domestic violence 
between the parties and a power imbalance in the relationship of the 
parties.” 56 When Beatrice left the matrimonial home in June of 2005, 
she took the children with her to a location which she did not disclose to 
Ron.  Ron did not find out where they were living until the following 
January.  He had no formal access to his daughters until one year after 
the separation.  At that time, weekly supervised access visits of one 
hour in duration began.   
 Infuriated, Ron responded by creating a series of internet sites and 
conducting a public campaign against what he alleged were Beatrice’s 
efforts to alienate the children from him.  He wrote a letter denouncing 
Beatrice to the principal of the girls’ school, and also created and 
distributed “press releases” about her and about the parties’ dispute.  
The Office of the Children’s Lawyer became involved in the case in 
2006, and a social worker from that agency prepared a report which was 
used at trial.  A social worker from the local Children’s Aid Society was 
also active in the case.  A six-day trial occurred in late summer 2009, at 
which neither party had the benefit of a lawyer.  Beatrice did not even 
formally testify, although she did present her case to the court and had 
witnesses speak for her.  The central issues in the trial were the parental 
alienation allegation, child custody, child support, and division of  family 
property. 
II. A. Economic Vulnerability of Canadian Families 
 The Peters are somewhat indicative of this economic vulnerability of Canadian 
families , although they were perhaps better off than most. Ron Peters was fortunate, to 
have a secure pension from the Government of Canada paying $48,306 per year.57 
Beatrice’s income was not disclosed by the case report.  However, the parties worked 
for ten years to build a business which appears to have consistently lost money and 
eventually gone bankrupt.  At the time of the judgment, Ron owed over $50,000 to the 
Canada Revenue Agency and Beatrice owed $26,000 to a credit counselling agency.  
After 30 years of hard work, their collective net worth was less than $300,000.58 
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  The end of an intimate cohabitational relationship is a time of financial stress for 
its members.  At the very least, cohabitation’s economies of scale are suddenly lost and 
transitional costs of establishing new domiciles must be absorbed.  Subsequent 
sections of this document will describe in detail the financial costs of relationship 
breakdown and family litigation. The ability of individuals to meet these challenges 
depends substantially on their economic position before the break-up occurred, and 
there is evidence that large numbers of Canadian families are already “on the edge” 
financially and ill-equipped to deal with relationship breakdown.  There is also evidence 
that the poorest Ontarians (those earning less than $20,000 per year) are 33% more 
likely than other Ontarians to experience family relationship problems.59 
 Canadians have become steadily more indebted and less likely to have savings, 
and this trend has persisted through economic recessions, recoveries, and booms.  This 
trend has reduced the ability of Canadians to draw upon reserves of cash and property 
in order to cushion the financial blow of relationship breakdown.60 The following chart, 
adapted from a recent Vanier Institute report authored by Roger Sauvé, illustrates the 
steadily increase over time in average debt per household.61 
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Figure 1: Average Canadian Household Debt in Constant 2007 Dollars 
 
One indicator of the capacity of Canadian households to “carry” this increasing debt is 
the ratio of household debt to income. This measure reached a new record of 145% in 
December of 2009.62 
 Turning from net wealth to household income, we find that many Canadian 
families are “just getting by.”  A key driver of increasing debt loads is the decreasing 
ability or willingness of the average household to save.  The average annual savings of 
Canadian households decreased from $7,700 in 1990 to $2,800 in 2000, although it 
recovered by 14% between 2000 and 2010.63  In the third quarter of 2009, the average 
Canadian household earned $66,200 and spent $63,000.64  The Canadian Payroll 
Association, reporting on a survey conducted in September of 2009, found that “59% of 
Canadian employees report they would have trouble making ends meet if their 
paycheque was delayed by even one week.”65  Given these financial realities, it is easy 
to see how the sudden and dramatic costs of relationship breakdown – such as legal 
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 fees and finding new housing – can be disastrous for Ontario’s families and their 
members.  
II. B. Sacrifices in Earning Potential Undertaken in Intact Families  
 As noted above, intriguing scholarly debates surround the role of economic and 
other choices in family formation.  Economic choices remain highly significant within the 
life of an intact family. If an individual chooses (or is coerced into) making sacrifices in 
earning potential while cohabiting in an intact family, those sacrifices give rise to 
financial difficulties after the relationship dissolves. Family responsibilities often lead 
Ontarians to make such sacrifices, and this is therefore a post-relationship challenge 
which has roots within the economic life of the intact family. This section will discuss the 
nature of individual earning-potential sacrifices, the persistent gender pattern in this 
phenomenon, and the post-relationship impact of earning-potential sacrifices. 
II. B. 1. How Family Life can Lead to Sacrifices in Individual Earning Potential 
 Sacrifices in earning potential typically take the form of an individual’s (i) choices 
to reduce participation in educational or training programs which would increase an 
individual’s earning potential; (ii) choices to voluntarily depart from the workforce, 
temporarily or permanently; or (iii) choices about where, how, and how much to work 
while within the workforce which diminish long-term earning potential.  An example of 
this third type of sacrifice is Beatrice Peters’ relocation between various Ontario towns 
as required by Ronald Peters’ career.66  Even though she worked in the same industry 
as her partner, such moves probably diminished her earning power.  
 Simply cohabiting in an intimate relationship may lead to such sacrifices being 
made.  In Beatrice Peters’ case, for example, they occurred long before she had 
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 children.  In addition to income, a household requires a certain amount of domestic 
labour in order to function.  It may be efficient for one party to curtail education or 
employment in order to discharge these functions, leaving the other to concentrate on 
income-generation.67  Even in the absence of efficiency gains, this arrangement may be 
adopted due to social pressures or gender role expectations.68 
 However it is the presence of young children which makes sacrifices in individual 
earning potential most likely.69  While the time required for domestic labour other than 
parenting may have declined with technological advances,70 parenting remains very 
time consuming and is, perhaps, becoming more so.71 Becoming a parent therefore 
provides a much stronger incentive to curtail employment or education than does simply 
cohabiting or marrying.  Many parents must pay for child care in order to continue 
working or attending school, and a substantial number are not capable of earning 
wages much in excess of what child care costs.  For these parents, sacrificing earning 
potential in favour of parenting is, in the short term, actually a way to save money. For 
other parents, emotional and/or social pressures push towards earning-power 
sacrifices. 
 The judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in the landmark 1992 Supreme Court 
Case of Moge v. Moge clearly identified the connection between parenting and 
individual earning-potential sacrifices: 
The most significant economic consequence of marriage or marriage 
breakdown…  usually arises from the birth of children.  This generally 
requires that the wife cut back on her paid labour force participation in 
order to care for the children, an arrangement which jeopardizes her 
ability to ensure her own income security and independent economic 
wellbeing.72 
 20
 Some parents leave the workforce entirely, either permanently or (more commonly) for 
temporarily during the infancy of their children.  Others remain employed but work fewer 
hours, choose flexible employment, or work night shifts so as to balance family 
schedules.73  The percentage of Canadians working weekends, evenings, nights, or 
rotating shifts increased from 23% to 29% between 1992 and 2009.74 The Peters’ 
arrangement – Ron home with the kids Monday to Friday, Beatrice at home on the 
weekend, each parent minding the shop when not parenting – is one example of this 
phenomenon. Employment decisions made in order to facilitate parenting can easily 
curtail individual or household earning potential in the short or long term. The Peters’ 
decision to leave guaranteed paycheques in the civil service and open a risky business 
which ultimately failed may have been motivated by the birth of their first daughter. 
II. B. 2. Quantifying Parenting  
 What Justice L’Heureux-Dubé demonstrated in Moge remains true today: women 
are substantially more likely than men to make sacrifices in their earning potential due 
to family responsibilities. For this among other reasons, they are more likely to 
experience financial challenges after relationship breakdown.  However, the available 
data does suggest a demographic trend to a more balanced distribution of wage-
generating and domestic tasks within Canadian households since Moge was decided. 
 A substantial body of literature exists about the gender allocation of parenting 
responsibilities in Canadian households.75 Perhaps the most obvious measure of 
parenting contributions is quantity of time which adults spend with their minor children.  
However scholars have identified other relevant contributions to parenting.  Joseph 
Pleck suggested that paternal involvement can be measured in terms of (i) the nature 
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 and quality of interaction with children and (ii) taking responsibility for decision-making, 
in addition to (iii) absolute number of hours spent in parenting.76  Duxbury and Higgins 
suggest that a parent who is responsible for children and makes decisions on their 
behalf experiences more stress than a parent who simply spends time with them.77 This 
might mean that parents in the former group are more likely to make individual earning-
power sacrifices in order to cope.  
II. B. 3. Persistence of Gender Patterns 
 However parenting is defined, researchers have found that women today usually 
do more of it than men do.  Duxbury and Higgins (2001) asked Canadian parents who 
had the “primary responsibility for child care” in their families.  63% of women replied 
that they did so, and 50% of men replied that their female partners did so.  Roughly 
39% stated that responsibility was shared.78  With regard to responsibility for child care, 
Duxbury and Higgins found little change between 1991 and 2001.  Another interesting 
indication comes from the National Longitudinal Survey on Children and Youth. In 
conducting this survey, Statistics Canada telephoned Canadian households and asked 
to speak to the “person who is the most knowledgeable” about the child. In 92% of the 
cases it was the mother of the child who came on the line.79 
 The gender pattern may be most pronounced with regard to the youngest 
children.80  Kerry Daly reported that, in 1998, “employed mothers in dual earner families 
with a child under 5 years of age spent an average of 91 minutes per day in personal 
childcare activities (feeding, washing and dressing children) compared to 47 minutes 
among fathers.”81 Citing a 2001 book about American women, Thomas Oldham recently 
noted that "only 34% of married women with children younger than age six work full 
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 time."82  Canadian law allows either mothers or fathers to take “parental leave” from 
paid employment immediately after the birth of a child.  Because this program does not 
replace the entire income of the parent, it constitutes a sacrifice in individual earning 
power undertaken in order to discharge family responsibilities.  Gillian Ranson observes 
that mothers remain much more likely than fathers to take parental leave, and this is 
another example of the persistent gender role pattern.83  In fact, fathers are less likely to 
have employment interruptions of any kind than childless men are.84 
 Beaujot and Ravanera analyzed time-use data from the 2005 General Social 
Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, in order to determine how men and women are 
dividing paid and unpaid work within families anchored by adult heterosexual 
relationships.85  Their results neatly summarize the persistence of a traditional gender 
pattern in Canadian families: 
the complementary-traditional (he does more paid work, she does more 
unpaid work) is the predominant model with 32.9%, followed by 
woman’s double burden (she is doing same amount of, or more, paid 
work, and more unpaid work) with 26.8%. … the role-sharing model, in 
which they do the same amount of unpaid work, comprises 26.5%.86 
These gender patterns are reflected in another finding from the same study: Canadian 
women tend to have jobs with more flexibility but lower pay than those of men.87  This is 
logically consistent with women’s efforts to balance paid employment with domestic 
labour. 
 Most recently, Ranson’s 2010 book Against the Grain provided a helpful literature 
review on these issues.88  The focus of Ranson’s volume is couples who have adopted 
equally-shared or female-breadwinner family models.  While arguing that this group 
constitutes a “vanguard,” she acknowledges that they are not representative of the 
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 majority.  Ranson’s conclusion is that "the bottom line, in Canada as in many other 
industrialized countries, is that the responsibilities of parenthood continue to be 
'gendered and privatized,' with mothers continuing to face greater demands than 
fathers.89 
II. B. 4. Evidence of Change and Gender Role Convergence within the Family 
 Despite the persistence of traditional gender roles, there is also evidence of 
historical and ongoing change. These changes may reduce the prevalence of individual 
earning-potential sacrifices, or distribute them more equitably among family members. 
This could ease the post-relationship financial disruption which these sacrifices cause. 
 The most dramatic social change has been the increase in female labour force 
participation over the past half-century.  Between 1960 and 2000, the proportion of 
Canadian women in the labour force rose from 32% to 71%.90  Canadian women still 
earn less than men on average  -- $24,400 versus $39,300 per year in 2003.91 
However, the gender wage gap shrank steadily between 1967 and 2003.92  Over the 
course of this period, women’s participation in registered retirement savings plans 
(RRSPs) and employer-sponsored pension plans also steadily increased, coming very 
close to gender parity on some measures.93  Kerry Daly observes that the “dual earner 
family” (both parents in the work force) is now the “dominant family form in Canada” and 
accounts for 7 out of 10 two parent families.94  Ranson adds that "the majority of young 
Canadian families in all regions, as well as in all economic, ethnic and language groups, 
have both parents either in the paid labour force or in education or training programs."95   
 Looking forward, Beaujot and Ravanera note that the growth of the service sector 
and the knowledge economy may benefit female workers more than male workers.  This 
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 is because women are more likely than men are to work in service industries, and also 
more likely to pursue post-secondary education.96  Increased female labour force 
participation has certainly not “solved” the problem of post-relationship economic 
disruption caused by individual earning potential sacrifices.  However, it has reduced 
markedly the number of women who have no capacity to earn income after a divorce or 
separation.  
 Significant, although less dramatic shifts have also taken place in the work and 
parenting behaviour of Canadian men.  There has been some decline in male labour 
force participation since 1971, roughly the same period during which women’s labour 
force participation was dramatically rising.97  Referring to American data, Ellen Galinsky 
and her colleagues observe that “men are taking more overall responsibility for the care 
of their children in 2008 than in 1992, according to themselves and their 
wives/partners.”98  Daly confirms that in Canada too, “the dominant trend in the 
contributions that women and men make to parenting and domestic work is one of 
convergence with women doing less and men doing more.”99  The Peters’ parenting 
arrangement in Sault Ste. Marie is representative of this trend, with Ron acting as the 
primary stay-at-home parent.100  Gillian Ranson argued that the non-traditional 
Canadian households which she studied (like the Peters) are at the vanguard of 
“change evident on a global scale,” and that "all this change, however slow and slight, is 
in the direction of more egalitarian relationships in the home."101 
II. B. 5. Post-Relationship Effects of Sacrifices 
 Earning potential sacrifices are and will continue to be a consequence of family 
life for many if not most Canadians.  As noted above, this is most powerfully true for 
 25
 parents.  The more non-paid family responsibility or labour an individual assumes, the 
more likely it is that he or she will curtail education or labour force participation. When 
and if those relationships end, what are the continuing effects of the earning-potential 
sacrifices which individual family members make? 
 The judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Moge gives a foundational account 
of the connection between earning-potential sacrifices within relationships and 
economic problems afterwards: 
Once the marriage dissolves, the kinds of nonmonetary contributions 
made by the wife may result in significant market disabilities.  The 
sacrifices she has made at home catch up with her and the balance 
shifts in favour of the husband who has remained in the work force and 
focused his attention outside the home.  In effect, she is left with a 
diminished earning capacity and may have conferred upon her husband 
an embellished one.  
… 
The financial consequences of the end of a marriage extend beyond the 
simple loss of future earning power or losses directly related to the care 
of children.  They will often encompass loss of seniority, missed 
promotions and lack of access to fringe benefits such as pension plans, 
life, disability, dental and health insurance.102 
 A substantial economic literature seeks to quantify the “wage depreciation effect” 
– the long-term impact on an individual’s earnings of temporary absences from the 
workforce. As noted above, leaving the workforce is the most dramatic (although not the 
only) type of sacrifice in earning potential which an individual can make due to family 
responsibilities.  In her 2005 article, Kathleen Spivey reviewed and added to this 
literature.103  Her study confirmed that “total non-employment time has a statistically 
significant depreciation effect on wages” and that a wage depreciation effect persisted 
from early-career interruptions even many years later.104  With regard to gender 
differences, Spivey found that “wage losses associated with non-employment were less 
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 severe for women than for men, although more past interruptions seemed to matter for 
women than men."105 Robert Leckey notes the continuing economic disadvantage faced 
by women leaving intimate relationships, which is at least partially attributable to the 
wage depreciation effect: 
recently divorced or separated mothers remain financially worse off than 
recently divorced or separated fathers … 44 percent of recently divorced 
or separated mothers have an annual personal income of less than 
$30,000, contrasted with 19 percent of recently divorced or separated 
fathers.106 
The spouse who did not make such sacrifices during the relationship has usually 
benefitted somewhat from the domestic focus of the spouse who did so.107  For 
example, Ron Peters’ ascent through the ranks of Parks Canada to become manager of 
Pukaskwa National Park might have been impossible had Beatrice not been willing to 
move with him between various postings.108  
 The legal remedy of spousal support is, among other things, designed to 
compensate the spouse who made earning-power sacrifices using the income of the 
spouse who did not.109  However, spousal support is by no means a complete solution 
to this problem.  It is ordered and/or paid in only a small minority of divorces and 
separations, and in the Peters’ case spousal support was not claimed.  Carol Rogerson 
estimated in 2002 that spousal support was paid in only 10-25% of divorce cases,110 
although it is possible that the development of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines 
since that date have increased its prevalence.  The Guidelines themselves propose a 
payor income “floor” of $20,000.  If neither spouse earns more than that amount, it is 
very unlikely that spousal support will be paid.111   
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 II. C. Conflict arising from relationship break-down 
 Family challenges are created not only by the economic life of the intact family, 
but also by what happens when the intimate relationship at the heart of the family 
dissolves. Most relationship break-downs are characterized by some degree of conflict 
between the adult parties. The Peters’ case had an unusually high degree of conflict, 
but family justice system workers will recognize as familiar many of the manifestations 
of hostility from that case.  If the family includes children who are old enough to be 
aware of the break-down, then they are likely to be affected by it in some way. This 
section will briefly review the literature on post-relationship conflict, and the costs which 
it imposes upon adults, children, and society.   
 Although post-relationship conflict may occur without any legal manifestation, 
conflict arising from relationship break-down frequently results in legal disputes.  A 2009 
telephone survey conducted for the Ontario Civil Legal Needs (OCLN) Project asked 
low- and middle-class Ontarians which civil legal problems they had experienced in the 
previous three years.112  "Family relationship problems" were reported by 12% of the 
respondents, and by 30% of all those who reported having any type of civil legal 
problem.  Family relationship problems were, by a substantial margin, the type of civil 
legal problem most often experienced by low- and middle-class Ontarians.  The 
prevalence of family problems was greater than the combined prevalence of the 
second- and third- most common civil problems.113 
 When family conflict does manifest itself in a legal form, it very often continues as 
such for extended periods of time.  The OCLN telephone survey found that, among the 
respondents who had experienced a family relationship problem at any time in the 
previous three years, 44% reported that the problem was still unresolved at the time of 
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 the survey.114  Three-quarters of those in this group stated that they had been trying to 
resolve the family relationship problem for a year or more.115  The Peters filed 
applications and counter-applications in January and February of 2006, and the 
judgment in their case was not released until November of 2009 – almost three years 
later. 
 There is an extensive literature about the effects of divorce and/or dysfunctional 
family conflict on adults and children.  A key conceptual issue in this literature is 
distinguishing the effects of conflict from the effects of the end of the relationship.116  
The scholarship at one point debated the impact of divorce itself on children, asking 
whether divorce is “bad” or “good” for children. The general consensus until perhaps the 
1980s was that divorce was, at best, a necessary evil. While this line of inquiry 
continues in some quarters,117 it now appears that conflict (especially violence) is the 
greater cause of mental health damage to children and adults, as opposed to 
relationship break-down itself.  The end of the relationship may in fact have positive 
effects if it ends or alleviates conflict by putting some distance between the parties. 
 While children have substantial resilience to the effects of family break-down,118 
there is also little doubt among child development experts that exposure to serious inter-
parental conflict can leave long-term scars.119 For example, the judge who decided the 
Peters’ case identified a serious risk that the children might be   
placed in the middle of much hostility between their parents who would 
be forced by the nature of the custodial arrangement to have more 
contact with each other than they have at the present time … the 
children are far more comfortable when their parents have less contact 
with each other.120 
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 It is at least plausible that family conflict can reduce the ability of children to be 
productive and contributing members of society in the long run, although this is very 
difficult to quantify.  If so, this is a significant social and economic cost. Post-relationship 
conflict is inevitable, but the extent and pathology of family conflict is influenced by the 
response to it.121  In evaluating potential responses to family challenges, reducing 
conflict –especially inter-parental conflict to which children are exposed – must be one 
of the goals.  
III. PREVENTATIVE RESPONSES TO FAMILY CHALLENGES 
 Part II of this paper identified three key family challenges: (i) the economic 
vulnerability of Canadian families, (ii) sacrifices in earning potential undertaken in intact 
families, and (iii) conflict arising on relationship break-down. Andrew Schepard has 
proposed that family conflict be identified and treated as a public health epidemic, due 
to its disease-like impacts upon society.122 This means that both prevention and 
treatment are important. This Part will focus on the ways in which the government might 
prevent family challenges or reduce their severity before they occur. 
III. A. Prevention of Relationship Break-Down  
 One way to reduce the impact of family challenges would be to reduce the 
number of intimate relationships which are voluntarily dissolved.  This was, indeed, a 
central social goal for many decades in Canada. Books were written, and professionals 
trained, with the goal of preventing divorce.123  Section 9 of the Divorce Act also reflects 
the policy objective of “saving” marriages.  It provides that family lawyers must “draw to 
the attention” of their clients to the statutory objective of “reconciliation of spouses,” and 
provide information about “marriage counselling or guidance facilities known to him or 
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 her that might be able to assist the spouses to achieve a reconciliation.”124  Some 
American scholars argue that preserving or “protecting” marriages should be an explicit 
goal of family law.125  For example, “covenant marriage,” a form of union which is 
designed to be more difficult to dissolve than normal marriage, is available to couples in 
some American states.126  The focus of this scholarship has generally been on saving 
marriages, as opposed to intimate cohabitations generally.  In fact, many of those who 
wish to “save marriage” from divorce also perceive non-marital cohabitation as a “threat” 
to marriage which society should resist. 
While the law can make the legal state of marriage more difficult to exit, it is difficult to 
see how it can preserve family affection or harmony.  Nor can people be forced to 
cohabit.  Preserving the legal form of a marriage which lacks affection, harmony, 
or cohabitation has no apparent purpose. For these reasons, it seems more 
promising to assume that large numbers of intimate relationships will continue to 
dissolve before death does them part, and to examine ways to prevent or mitigate 
the challenges which arise when they do so. 
III. B. Prevention of Challenges Arising Upon Break-down  
 This section will consider what society can do for members of intact families so 
as to reduce the severity of the challenges they will face when and if those relationships 
dissolve.  Richard Susskind seems to be correct in suggesting that people "prefer to 
have a fence at the top of a cliff rather than an ambulance at the bottom."127  It is 
worthwhile to consider how family challenges might be prevented.  
 A key question which has emerged from the LCO’s public consultations pertains 
to the idea of “early intervention” in family disputes.128  How early is early enough?  The 
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 answer might be that early intervention must begin during cohabitations, in anticipation 
of the fact that many cohabitations will eventually be ended voluntarily.  One interesting 
finding from the Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project telephone survey suggests some 
scope for prevention of challenges. 14% of the respondents said that in the future they 
would be likely to experience family relationship problems.129  If it is true that many 
Ontarians anticipate future family challenges, they may be receptive to initiatives to 
prevent or mitigate those challenges.  The government should ensure that its public 
information initiatives about family law are made available and accessible to 
Ontarians who are still cohabiting in intact relationships, not only to those who 
have decided to cease cohabiting. 
III. B. 1. Education 
 The severity of the conflict which arises upon relationship break-down is to some 
extent dependent on the manner in which the parties communicate and address that 
conflict. Education as prophylaxis for dysfunctional family conflict could conceivably 
start before the conflict arises, if it were delivered in high school or as a pre-requisite to 
marriage.130  The Ontario secondary school curriculum already includes a course 
entitled “Healthy Active Living Education.” In this course, students are “given 
opportunities to refine their decision- making, conflict-resolution, and interpersonal skills, 
with a view to enhancing their mental health and their relationships with others.”131  The 
government should consider teaching strategies for communication and conflict-
resolution in intimate relationships in the context of the “Healthy Active Living 
Education” in Grade 12, or in another course.  Doing so might enhance Ontarians’ 
ability to deal with post-relationship conflict in a manner which mitigates rather than 
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 exacerbates it.  It could conceivably even increase the chance that intimate 
relationships remain harmonious and healthy. 
III. B. 2. Marriage and Cohabitation Contracts 
 Individuals entering a marriage or cohabitation are permitted to establish by 
contract what their financial obligations to each other will be when and if their 
relationship dissolves.132  Doing so can substantially reduce the potential for 
subsequent conflict and disagreement, and can create clear expectations for the 
parties.  Justice Québec publicizes information about cohabitation contracts on a 
website, which includes an explicit recommendation that  
People who chose to live in a de facto union should specify how they 
intend to live as a couple and how they intend to manage their family 
relationship to avoid disputes and disagreements… because a written 
document provides more lasting proof than a verbal agreement, it is in 
your interest to sign a written cohabitation contract with your de facto 
spouse.133 
By contrast, the family law section of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General does 
not appear to mention cohabitation or marriage contracts.134  The Government should 
consider expanding the information which it provides about pre-marital and 
cohabitation contracts.  Potentially, the Ministry’s web site could include an 
explicit recommendation to create such a contract, or a web-based tool to help 
parties draft contracts. 
 However, it is very difficult for individuals to negotiate about entitlements and 
obligations which they never expect to become real, insofar as people generally do not 
enter intimate relationships while contemplating their dissolution.  If the entitlements and 
obligations do become real, this often does not occur for many years after the contract 
was initially negotiated.  For these among other reasons, very few Ontarians enter 
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 marriage or cohabitation contracts.  It is not clear that amendments to the Ministry web 
site would substantially change this reality.  
III. B. 3. Discouraging Earning-Potential Sacrifices: Public Investments in Child 
Care 
 As established above, sacrifices in earning potential undertaken for family 
reasons can lead to economic challenges after relationship break-down. Some such 
sacrifices are an inevitable and healthy response on the part of Ontarians to their family 
responsibilities.  However, Ontario might want to discourage the most dramatic form of 
earning potential sacrifice – extended or permanent departures from the labour force.  
To put the point in positive terms, the state may wish to encourage continuing 
employment and/or educational activities by parents. 
 As noted above, parenting is the family responsibility which is most likely to lead 
Ontarians to make earning-potential sacrifices. Therefore, increasing the supply and 
affordability of non-parent child care is one way to reduce the need for those sacrifices 
and thereby reduce the post-separation disruption which they cause.  This is particularly 
true for mothers. Willem Adema observes that “the development of formal childcare 
allows female employment to expand further, both in terms of the number of female 
workers and the hours they engage in paid employment.”135  As female labour force 
participation rates have increased, there has been a commensurate increase in the 
proportion of non-parental child care.136 
 However, by comparison to other wealthy countries Canada has made very 
limited public investments in child care. The OECD found in 2006 that Canada’s 
investment in early childhood services was equal to only 0.3% of GDP.137  This was the 
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 lowest figure among 14 OECD countries studied in the report.138  This report also noted 
that only approximately 24% of Canadian children between the ages of 0 and 6 have 
access to regulated day care.139  
 Despite repeated electoral promises, there is still no national non-parental child 
care program. Indeed the most recent substantive federal initiative was the creation of 
the Canada Child Tax Benefit, which takes the form of a monthly cash payment to 
families with minor children.140  While this initiative may facilitate the purchase of private 
child care, it does not increase the supply of non-parental child care and provides no 
incentive to parental labour force participation. It was not intended to be, and does not 
serve as, a deterrent to sacrifices in earning potential. 
 Quebec is the exception to generally low overall public investment in child care. 
In this province public provision of day care is established and widespread. According to 
OECD statistics published in 2005, 40% of all of Canada’s childcare capacity is in 
Quebec despite the fact that only 22% of Canadian children live there.141  In 2001, 
Ontario’s provincial government spent $232 on childcare for every child aged 0-12.  This 
compares to $980 per child in Quebec, and a national average of $386 per child. 
However, the provincial government’s recent initiative to provide free full-day 
kindergarten is a step in the right direction, insofar as this will facilitate labour-force 
participation by the parents of four- and five-year olds.142  State provision of child 
care reduces the likelihood of parental earning-power sacrifices, which in turn 
reduces economic challenges in the wake of relationship break-down.  In 
weighing the costs and benefits of family policies, this fact should be considered. 
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 III. B. 4. Discouraging Earning-Potential Sacrifices: Tax Reform 
 Feminist scholars have pointed out that some elements of Canada’s tax system 
disincentivize income-generating labour by individuals who cohabit with others who earn 
more than they do.  For example, Canadians are now permitted to contribute $5,000 per 
year into tax-free savings accounts (TFSAs) which offer significant tax savings.  A 
married individual is permitted to contribute $5,000 per year into his or her own account, 
plus an additional $5,000 per year into his or her spouse’s account. The higher-earning 
spouse can do so regardless of whether the other spouse is earning income.  The 
family can therefore receive the entire $10,000 per year tax shelter benefit despite the 
fact that only one individual is earning income to make contributions.  An alternative 
would be to allow individuals to contribute only to their own TFSAs. If this were the 
case, the TFSA would operate as an incentive to both spouses to earn income.  Only by 
doing so would the family be able to obtain the full $10,000 per year tax benefit.143  
Governments should consider restructuring benefits such as TFSA so that they 
incentivize income-generation by both spouses, and disincentivize earning-power 
sacrifices. 
 Kathleen Lahey argues that the tax system is one contributor to “unrelenting 
pressure on women to substitute unpaid work for paid work at the margins.”144  One 
source of this pressure which she identifies is “joint tax instruments,” defined as “tax 
provision[s] that adjus[t] tax liability either upward or downward on the basis of having a 
spouse or common-law partner.”145  For example, the dependent spouse credit reduces 
tax liability when a taxpayer’s spouse is being supported by the taxpayer.146  Lahey 
argues that that joint tax instruments are disincentives to women’s labour force 
participation because their benefit is reduced or lost if the spouse with lower earning 
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 potential joins the labour force.  Whether this spouse is male or female, the salient point 
is that joint tax instruments may encourage sacrifices in earning potential, and thereby 
exacerbate economic problems post-separation. Joint tax instruments have complex 
costs and benefits, but it should be recognized by law-makers that their 
disincentive to labour force participation is among their drawbacks.  
 Lisa Philipps has also observed that tax law can act as an incentive or 
disincentive to intra-household transfers of wealth to the lower-earning spouse.147  For 
example, Canadians are now allowed to “split” pension income with their spouses so as 
to obtain tax benefits.148  However, the split may be purely “notional” – legal title to the 
pension income need not be transferred to the lower-earning spouse.  If income splitting 
were to be dependent on actual legal transfers, then the economically weaker spouse 
would thereby be empowered during the relationship.  This could reduce the economic 
challenges experienced by that spouse after relationship break-down, especially for 
those who cohabited in a non-marital relationship and are therefore not entitled to 
statutory property division.149  While requiring legal transfers of property would increase 
the intrusiveness of the tax system, the legislature should consider whether this 
reform might bring about a more equitable distribution of property within intact 
relationships, and thereby reduce post-separation economic challenges. 
III. B. 5. State Compensation of Caregiving 
 An alternative to discouraging earning-potential sacrifices is to compensate the 
individuals who make those sacrifices in order to perform caregiving tasks.  Doing so 
may lead to them having more savings and economic independence with which to 
weather the shock of relationship dissolution. Some feminist scholars have argued that 
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 the state should compensate caregivers directly.150  The Law Commission of Canada’s 
Beyond Conjugality report proposed consideration of refundable tax credits for 
caregivers, or direct grants to them.151  The Income Tax Act currently allocates tax 
credits both to parents of minor children and to caregivers for the elderly and 
disabled.152  However other feminists, including Kathleen Lahey, respond that 
compensating caregiving would simply reinforce traditional gender expectations and 
push caregivers out of the workforce.153 
 However, state compensation of caregiving has limited potential as a tool to 
promote economic independence after relationship breakdown.  It is not clear that tax 
credits or even direct payments provided to a member of an intact relationship will be 
preserved for the benefit of that family member, as opposed to becoming part of the 
general “family finances.”  It might be possible to somehow segregate these funds for 
the personal benefit of the caregiver should the relationship eventually dissolve, e.g. by 
adding them to the Canada Pension Plan account of the caregiver.  However doing so 
would mean that the financial benefit would not be available to the caregiver and his or 
her family at the time when the caregiving was actually happening. 
IV. POST-BREAKDOWN RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES  
IV. A. Responding to Challenges After Relationship Breakdown 
 Even if preventative initiatives are pursued, relationship breakdown will continue 
to confront Ontarians with legal and financial challenges.  This section will address 
techniques for responding to these challenges after they arise.  It will begin with the 
least adversarial methods, and work towards traditional civil litigation.  Section D, below, 
will consider the costs and benefits of administrative responses to family challenges. 
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 With regard to all potential responses to relationship breakdown, a key fact is that, as 
the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper noted, family problems come in “clusters.”154 
For example, while parenting disputes are fundamentally different from financial 
disputes, they present themselves within the same families, and family courts must 
respond to them together.  More broadly, family law problems “cluster” with other types 
of legal problems.  The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project Report identified family 
relationship issues as among the types of legal problems which are most likely to be 
experienced in tandem with other legal problems.155 
IV. A. 1. Supplying Legal Information to the Public 
 Legal information can be defined to include both substantive information about 
family law, and information about legal procedures and dispute resolution options. Legal 
information is distinct from legal services which are personalized and provided directly 
by professionals.156  The provision of legal information is very inexpensive, by 
comparison to other government responses to post-relationship challenges. Information, 
once created, can be reproduced for very little cost for an unlimited number of users. 
Moreover, unlike legal services, ADR, or litigation, consuming legal information has little 
or no cost for the individuals who access it (assuming that the government provides for 
free.)  From a cost-benefit analysis point of view, state initiatives to create legal 
information are worth undertaking even if they have only modest benefits for Ontarians 
experiencing family challenges.  In other words, because the cost is small, only a small 
benefit need be demonstrated for legal information.  Very real benefits do seem to be 
offered by family legal information initiatives, and the government has responded with 
what is already a fairly comprehensive campaign.  However, this section will propose a 
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 few initiatives which might make a broader range of legal information accessible to a 
broader range of Ontarians.  
 Ontario made substantial investments in providing legal information about family 
challenges this area.  Family Law Information Centres (FLIC) are found in all of our 
family courts.157  These contain brochures and other documents. Some but not all 
FLICs are staffed by employees who provide general information about the system.  
Law Help Ontario, at the 361 University Ave. court in Toronto, offers information to self-
represented litigants using an innovative combination of lawyers and written 
information.158 The province has also provided funding for internet-based family 
information initiatives.  Statutes and case law are increasingly available for free 
online.159  The Ministry of the Attorney General has recently expanded its “Family Law 
Resources” page, which now includes a comprehensive “frequently asked questions” 
section and pictures of sample courtroom layouts.160  The Ontario Civil Legal Needs 
Project asked Ontarians about their familiarity and experiences with five public 
information services.161  They found that “although only 1 to 8 per cent of those 
surveyed had heard of any of the websites, their satisfaction levels were very high (81 
per cent and higher).”162  This suggests that the quality and utility of these public 
information sources is very good, but the government needs to put more effort into 
publicizing them, so that more Ontarians may benefit. 
  More narrowly-focused online initiatives include the Family Law Education 
for Women (FLEW) site.163  The central message of the FLEW site is that all Ontarians, 
regardless of ethnic background or family situation, have the right to the protection of 
our family law statutes.164 The FLEW website appears to provide information which 
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 helpful and accurate for both women and men.  It is unclear why it is branded as being 
“for women,” given that our statutes and case law apply equally to men and women and 
given that men and women both need information about family law.  Given that this 
web-site is funded by the provincial government, the government should ask that 
it be rebranded to emphasize its utility to all Ontarians.  
 The internet appears to be the most logical medium for delivering family law 
information to Ontarians.  The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project found that, even 
among low- and middle-class Ontarians, 84% have access to the internet.165  However, 
most of the internet-based legal information initiatives identified above are 
predominantly text-based.  (FLEW is an exception, providing audio streams of 
information and sign-language videos.)  Given that many Ontarians have limited English 
literacy, the province should consider providing family law information on 
websites in video format. 
 Parent Information Sessions are group classes in which information about 
separation and family law are presented through oral presentations and videos.  These 
are mandatory in Toronto’s Superior Court of Justice166 and are available on a voluntary 
basis in certain other family courts. Parenting information sessions are soon to be 
launched in the Brampton family court.167  Based on the author’s observations,168 there 
is a fairly limited degree of interactivity in these sessions.  Participants are allowed to 
ask some questions but queries about the specific facts of a case are discouraged and 
the primary mode is one-way provision of information from the leaders to the 
participants. For this reason, these programs are more appropriately classified as “legal 
information” rather than “legal services.”  
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  The literature is somewhat ambivalent about the benefits of Parent Information 
Sessions, which are usually evaluated (if at all) in terms of whether or not they reduce 
litigation.  Ellis and Anderson (2003) reviewed the literature and conducted their own 
study of Family Information Sessions being held in Ontario at that time for divorcing 
parents.  Their conclusion was that these programs reduce use of court resources by 
inducing settlement.169  However, not all research on these programs has replicated the 
results about reduced use of court resources.  Versaevel studied a voluntary parent 
education program in Washoe County, Nevada.170  She reviewed the court files of 
litigants who had and who had not participated in the classes, and concluded that  "no 
clear correlation could be found that supported the idea that parent education classes 
could help resolve matters faster.”171  Shelley Kierstead compared a sample of litigants 
who had attended a program with a control group which had not.172  She found that, 
although there were significant differences between the two groups with regard to 
certain elements of litigiousness, “considered as one combined variable, there was 
statistically significant difference in litigiousness between the sample group and the 
control group.”173  A more comprehensive evaluation of Parenting Information 
Sessions is necessary before their publicly-funded expansion can be 
recommended.  
 A great deal of legal information which would be useful to Ontarians at the time of 
relationship breakdown remains inaccessible to them or expensive enough to be 
beyond the reach of most self-represented middle class litigants.  For example, the Law 
Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) conducts Continuing Legal Education seminars, for 
which lawyers write research papers without compensation.  LSUC has an online 
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 archive of all of these papers, and a database of video-recordings from the seminars.  
However, these are not publicly available for free,174 despite the fact that LSUC does 
not generally compensate the lawyers who deliver the seminars and write the CLE 
papers. For example, LSUC held a four hour “Six Minute Family Lawyer” program in 
December 2009, which provided a broad overview of key issues in family law.  This 
program is archived online, but costs $150.00 to access.  Most other family law CLE 
programs cost even more.  In light of LSUC’s statutory duty to “act so as to 
facilitate access to justice for the people of Ontario” and “protect the public 
interest,”175 the province should ask LSUC to make family law CLE materials 
publicly available for free or reduce their prices.  If this is not possible, these CLE 
materials should at least be made available in Ontario’s public libraries.  
 The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) have quickly become a central 
feature of spousal support law in Canada.176 However, by comparison to the Child 
Support Guidelines, the SSAG are relatively complex and difficult for many self-
represented litigants to use.  Determining a spousal support entitlement using the “with 
child support” formula in the SSAG would require either advanced math skills or access 
to software such as DivorceMate.177  Using DivorceMate to calculate a single spousal 
support entitlement costs at least $350.178  The provincial and federal governments 
should cooperate in creating free on-line software to calculate Spousal Support 
Advisory Guidelines ranges. 
 Richard Susskind has noted that people who have legal rights or obligations are 
often unaware of them.179  This point seems particularly true in the family law context.  
For example, the matrimonial home remedies provided by Part II of the Family Law Act 
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 are probably not front of mind for individuals at the time of relationship breakdown.180  
However the rights provided therein, such as the equal right of spouses to possess the 
matrimonial home,181 are potentially very valuable.  Susskind proposes that the state 
might proactively provide legal information to citizens at the time when they need it, 
using biographical information about the individual possessed by the state: 
once an individual builds up a profile of his or her activities, or joins 
communities, whether open or closed, of people with shared interests, 
then distilled, relevant, and tailored briefings will be sent to them.  In this 
way, citizens may be urged to be proactive.182  
Marriage and child-birth might be examples of activities which would trigger 
"tailored  briefings."  When an Ontarian citizen gets married or becomes a parent, 
the province could send an information package by email or post.  This package 
would, among other things, identify family law issues which that citizen might 
eventually encounter.  While privacy concerns would be a possible impediment to 
such an initiative, the idea is certainly an intriguing option for providing legal information 
about family challenges to Ontarians. 
IV. A. 2. Increasing the supply and affordability of legal services 
 No matter how comprehensive and accessible, legal information is not a 
complete substitute for personalized legal services.183 Services can be offered by 
lawyers, or by other professionals such as paralegals and social workers who have 
experience working with the family justice system.  A central finding of the LCO’s public 
consultations is that there is a broad diversity of different “entry points” to the family 
justice system, staffed by a wide variety of different professionals who provide services 
and information.184  
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  However, large numbers of Ontarians use the family justice system with little if 
any personalized assistance. The Ontario Bar Association recently found that that 40% 
of all civil litigants lack lawyers, and that the rate of self-representation among family 
litigants is even greater than this average.185  In 2009, another report stated that 
approximately 70% of family litigants are unrepresented.186  While some of these 
individuals do not wish to be represented, many if not most would like to have legal 
representation but do not believe that they can afford it.187  A survey of Kingston family 
court litigants without lawyers published in 2005 found that 83% stated that they were 
unable to afford the legal fees.188  
 The actual cost of family legal services varies widely. A survey of lawyers 
conducted by Canadian Lawyer magazine found that the average legal fee for a 
contested divorce in Ontario is $12,602.  The average fee for a civil case culminating in 
a two-day trial was $45,477.189  However, it also appears that many Ontarians obtain 
more affordable legal services, probably because their matters are not “contested” and 
do not culminate in trials.  A 2009 telephone survey conducted for the Ontario Civil 
Legal Needs Project identified low- and middle-class Ontarians who had sought legal 
assistance for a non-criminal matter in the previous three years.190  Among those who 
had obtained legal services, 28% said that the services were free, and an additional 
19% said that they paid less than $1,000.191 Legal Aid Ontario reported that, in 2008-
2009, the cost of the average family client funded by that agency was $1826.00.192 
 Nevertheless, the OCLN survey also found that many individuals experiencing 
family challenges have particular difficulty accessing legal services.  81% of those who 
had experienced this type of challenge in the previous three years had sought legal 
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 services, but 30% of those who did so “had difficulty” in obtaining it.193  Among low-and 
middle-class Ontarians who had a civil justice problem but did not seek legal 
assistance, the perceived cost of lawyers was by far the most common reason for not 
doing so.194  Lowering the cost of legal services would make them more accessible to 
Ontarians experiencing post-separation family challenges. Having access to 
experienced and competent professional help would certainly reduce the strain which 
family challenges place on Ontarians in this position. There are a variety of initiatives by 
which the province might lower the cost of legal services, each of which has a distinct 
set of costs and benefits. 
 One obvious option would be to increase the supply of legal aid available for 
family law disputes.  Legal aid allows individuals to obtain the services of a lawyer paid 
by the government.  These services are available for family law matters through the 
Family Law offices run by Legal Aid Ontario (LAO). 195 In 2008-2009, LAO issued 
30,107 certificates for family matters, spending $50,755,000.00 on these services.196 
However, it is very difficult to obtain comprehensive LAO-funded representation for 
private family law disputes which do not include child protection or criminal elements.197  
One recent report claimed that "over the past decade there has been a 30% drop in 
lawyers accepting certificates from family law clients who qualify for legal aid."198 
 One of the most intriguing findings of the OCLN survey was that “One in three 
respondents … said they prefer to resolve their legal needs by themselves with legal 
advice, but not necessarily with the assistance of a legal professional.”199  The 
provincial government might wish to respond by de-emphasizing funding of 
comprehensive legal representation in favour of providing more limited legal 
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 services to a broader group of people.  Examples of these more limited services 
include LSUC’s a telephone Lawyer Referral Service which offers members of the 
public a free 30 minute consultation with a lawyer.200  Other forms of free legal services 
currently available in Ontario family courts include duty counsel and volunteer law 
student assistance from the Pro Bono Students Canada Family Law Program.  Another 
way to make public dollars go further is to subsidize legal clinics which provide limited 
family legal services at a reduced and predictable rate. Many Ontarians who are unable 
to afford family legal services as they are currently structured would be able to pay a 
smaller and more predictable amount.  For example, Atlanta’s Family Law Information 
Centers offer 30 minute consultations which in some cases carry a nominal fee of 
roughly $10.201  
 Publicly-funded personalized legal services can also be provided remotely, 
and the government should explore this possibility.  The LSUC Lawyer Referral 
Service mentioned above202 might be complemented by a website to which Ontarians 
could submit queries about family disputes.  Many questions could be answered by 
paralegals or workers in low-cost jurisdictions abroad; this would allow a more 
expansive service to be provided at a lower cost.203 
 If the government wishes to reduce the cost and increase the accessibility of 
legal services without further public expenditure, then it might consider lowering the 
barriers to the private-sector provision of legal services.204  At present, the 
Solicitors Act makes it illegal for anyone not “admitted and enrolled as a solicitor” to 
represent another individual in court.205  This rule (which has very limited exceptions) 
has made it very difficult for paralegals or others to provide legal services to Ontarians 
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 experiencing family challenges.  Canada’s Competition Bureau has argued convincingly 
that “law societies should neither prohibit related service providers (such as 
paralegals…) from performing legal tasks, nor limit their ability to do so, unless 
there is compelling evidence of demonstrable harm to the public.”206  Whether 
there is sufficient evidence of demonstrable harm in this case is an open question. 
 The province subjected paralegals to LSUC regulation in 2007,207 despite the 
Competition Bureau’s warning that “to the extent that paralegals need to be regulated, 
the proper avenue for this is not through the law societies, given the obvious conflict of 
interest that arises from having one competitor regulate another.”208  In May of 2010 a 
resolution was briefly brought before the LSUC annual general meeting which would 
have opened a discussion about authorizing paralegal family law practice.209  This 
proposal was met with fierce opposition from Ontario lawyers, and was withdrawn 
before being considered.210  The objection of many lawyers to paralegal family law 
practice was summarized by Mary Reilly, treasurer of the Family Lawyers Association of 
Ontario:  
Our concern is that family law is extremely complicated. You have to 
have knowledge of a lot of different pieces of legislation. It isn't a case of 
just giving them a couple of courses, and they're up to speed.211 
Certain areas of family law are more complicated than others, and Reilly’s argument 
might be more valid for some areas than for others. One option would be to allow 
paralegal practice with regard to child support and custody and access, which 
are not, in most cases, legally complex.  Property division, spousal support, and 
other issues could be reserved for lawyers. These latter issues are both more 
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 complex and more likely to be relevant by wealthier individuals who are better able to 
afford lawyers’ fees. 
 Short of licensing paralegal family law practice, there are various other ways in 
which the province might make it easier to provide family legal services.  For example, 
LSUC might consider waiving the articling requirement for law school graduates 
wishing to practice family law.  Family lawyers might be exempted from some of 
the obligations which the Law Society places on lawyers which increase the cost 
of doing business, such as the new continuing professional development 
requirement.212  It is at least possible that Ontario lawyers are actually overqualified for 
the average family law dispute experienced by lower- and middle-class Ontarians.  If so, 
and if reducing qualification requirements would increase the supply of family legal 
services and thereby lower their price, the Law Society and the government should 
consider doing so.213 
 The cost of such initiatives would take the form of lowered standards, which 
might or might not translate into less satisfactory services being provided to clients. The 
value of having competent, knowledgeable, and dedicated people working in the system 
should not be underestimated.  Julie Lassonde reported that one of the reasons why the 
LCO’s public consultations succeeded in bringing together individuals with divergent 
perspectives on highly emotional matters was the trust relationships which those 
individuals had with their lawyers and other service providers.214 These lawyers and 
service providers were able to convene round-table meetings and focus groups.  This 
attests to the profound value of high-quality, personalized service in dealing with family 
challenges.   
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  As important as high quality services are, it is not clear that law school and the 
LSUC bar admission course are necessary and sufficient preparation for providing 
services of this nature to Ontarians experiencing post-relationship family challenges.  
One interesting point of reference regarding the value of lawyers’ services versus other 
services is a report authored by Rae Kaspiew and her colleagues evaluating Australia’s 
2006 Family Law reforms.215  Individuals who had used the family justice system and 
had obtained services from lawyers and/or non-lawyers were asked whether they would 
recommend the services they obtained.  Lawyers did not produce higher rates of client 
satisfaction than most of the alternative service providers.216 It would be very useful to 
study the satisfaction rates of Ontario clients of family lawyers and alternative family 
service providers.217  Such a study might confirm or deny the proposition that only 
licensed lawyers are capable of providing useful legal services to Ontarians 
experiencing family challenges.218   
 Another option is to restructure the way in which legal services are provided.  In 
the traditional model, a lawyer is retained to represent a client until the client’s legal 
problem is resolved.  Fees are calculated on an hourly basis.  While the client may 
withdraw from this arrangement at any time, he or she often has little idea at the outset 
how much it will cost to resolve the problem.  In addition to the hourly rate itself, the 
unpredictability of the final bill is one of the factors which make legal services seem 
unaffordable to middle class Ontarians.  Richard Susskind proposes an alternative to 
this model, which would involve a lower and more predictable price tag for the 
consumer: 
decomposing legal work that has been, or should be undertaken … into 
constituent tasks and allocating these to the least costly sources of 
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 service that we can find, so long as this multi-sourcing and mass 
customization does not fail to deliver the requisite quality of guidance 
that the non-lawyer needs.219 
“Unbundling” of legal services has been identified by the Ontario Civil Legal Needs 
project as a possible way to increase affordability.220 This would allow clients to do 
some things for themselves while obtaining legal assistance for the most challenging 
portions of litigation (such as oral advocacy.)  The Ontario government should work 
with the Law Society to encourage the provision of unbundled family law 
services, provided that doing so would make them more accessible without 
excessively reducing quality.  
IV. A. 3. Alternative / Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
 ADR can be defined as any structured dispute-resolution process other than 
courtroom adjudication. While the “A” in ADR once stood for “alternative,” it is 
increasingly being used to stand for “appropriate.”221 This signifies that adjudication is 
no longer the privileged or primary avenue for the resolution of family law disputes.222  
However, the word “appropriate” also leaves open the possibility that a litigation process 
may in some cases be more appropriate than other alternatives.  For example, it has 
been argued that, at least in cases of power imbalance of domestic abuse, the 
structured environment of a court-room offers the best opportunity for the rights and 
interests of vulnerable parties to be protected.223 
 The rise of ADR in family law can be traced to the “divorce revolution” which 
began in the late 1960s.  As a result of legal and social changes, courts were newly 
confronted with large numbers of family disputes.224  They responded, in part, by 
experimenting with a wide variety of programs and interventions, the primary purpose of 
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 which was to encourage settlement.225 These public sector, court-connected programs 
and interventions were an early form ADR, although most ADR in Ontario today is 
conducted in the private sector. 
 The continuing demand for ADR services is created by the fact that family 
litigation is very expensive for the parties, their children, and the state. Scholars, policy-
makers, and Canadians confronting family challenges therefore look for other ways of 
resolving family disputes which impose fewer costs.226  Nor is the case for ADR made 
exclusively by critics of lawyers -- lawyers themselves are embracing it.227 For example, 
the Ontario Bar Association Family Law Section, a group of lawyers, recently joined with 
two ADR organizations in calling for “non-adversarial options” to become the "primary 
framework for resolving family matters."228 
 Today, the most common forms of ADR in the Ontario family law context are 
collaborative family law, mediation, and arbitration. The latter two may be practiced 
independently of each other, or may be combined as mediation-arbitration (“Med-
Arb”).229  Beyond these core techniques, some scholars would give ADR a broader 
definition, for example including solicitor negotiation or custody evaluation under this 
rubric.230 
 The evaluation literature has sought to weigh the costs and benefits of different 
types of ADR.  Commonly, a specific type of mediation, assessment, or parent 
education is evaluated in terms of the number of cases which settled during or 
immediately after the process.231  While these studies often have very small sample 
sizes,232 they do help establish what programs help reduce the costs of litigation.  
Qualitative techniques such as interviews and surveys have been deployed in some of 
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 these evaluations in order to more comprehensively analyze costs and benefits.233 
Comprehensive qualitative evaluations of family process are more labour-intensive than 
quantitative reports on settlement rates, and is therefore often conducted by the state 
itself234 or with public funding.235 While such small scale pilot projects are perhaps the 
most common method by which costs and benefits of alternative mechanisms have 
been studied, a valuable set of sources go beyond assessing a single program.  
Experiments and literature about costs and benefits have originated in state- and 
province-wide initiatives236 and in partnerships between universities and courts.237 Inter-
jurisdictional comparisons are rare, but very helpful when they do appear.238 
 Mediation is perhaps the oldest and most widespread form of ADR used for 
family challenges.  In Ontario, free court-adjunct mediation is available in the 17 court-
houses which are part of the Family Court Branch of the Superior Court of Justice (also 
known as the “unified family court.”)239 Mediation is also available at many of the other 
family courts.  Full or partial settlement is reached in 79 percent of Ontario family 
mediations.240  Mediation is usually less costly and more therapeutic than litigation,241 
and there is some evidence that resolutions reached using this dispute-resolution 
technique are more durable than those which are the result of adjudication.242 Jennifer 
McIntosh and her colleagues compared found that including children in mediation 
produced more durable agreements.243  On the other hand, mediation may produce 
unjust results in the many cases in which power imbalances and/or domestic violence 
are factors.244  
 From a cost-benefit point of view, the great advantage of mediation is that it can 
produce durable settlements using a very small resource input.  The parties need not 
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 have lawyers to participate in mediation. A successful mediation obviates the need for 
future judicial intervention, thereby potentially saving public resources given that 
mediators are much less costly to the taxpayer than judges are.  These facts make 
mediation a very compelling option in an environment of resource scarcity like that 
which prevails in the Ontario family justice system.  The provincial government 
should ensure that free or affordable mediation is available to all Ontario family 
litigants for appropriate cases. 
 Child assessment by mental health professional or social worker in a parenting 
case can arguably be considered another form of ADR.  This categorization is 
questionable because the primary function of assessors is to identify and recommend 
the parenting arrangement which would be in the best interests of a child or children .245  
This evaluative function is distinct from the dispute-resolution function which is at the 
core of ADR. However, there is substantial evidence that neutral assessments generally 
speed the parties to a negotiated resolution. 246 Assessments sometimes produce 
settlement incidentally,247 and sometimes they do so because the assessor consciously 
tries to achieve this result.  The provincial government funds child assessments 
conducted by social workers from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.248  Although the 
applicable statute defines these assessments as purely evaluative or forensic in nature, 
there is compelling evidence that these social workers also encourage the parties to 
settle by engaging in informal mediation.249  These informal mediation efforts by the 
OCL’s social workers in custody and access cases should be encouraged in appropriate 
cases, because early settlement of the case is usually in the best interests of the child.  
A new section should be added to the Children’s Law Reform Act which 
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 acknowledges and protects the mediative function of OCL social workers in 
custody and access cases.250  
 Collaborative family law (CFL) is a relatively new initiative,251 which is quickly 
gaining adherents in Ontario.252  The distinguishing feature of collaborative family law is 
the “Collaborative Practice Participation Agreement.”253  This contract prevents the 
lawyers involved from representing the parties if litigation occurs and which also 
commits everyone involved to a cooperative and constructive approach to dispute-
resolution.  CFL seems to consistently produce durable settlements while avoiding 
litigation.  However CFL is not itself without costs.  Insofar as it requires the parties to 
both retain lawyers as well as, often, other professionals, it is beyond the financial reach 
of most Ontarians.  Like mediation, it may lead to vulnerable parties settling for 
markedly less than they might obtain at trial,254 insofar as it de-emphasizes legal 
entitlements in favour of interest-based negotiation.255 While CFL is certainly a valuable 
option for Ontarians who can afford it, it is not clear that the provincial government 
should be involved in its provision. 
 Parenting coordination generally takes place after a parenting agreement or 
order is in place between separated parents.256 A parenting coordinator is generally 
tasked with mediating and arbitrating smaller disputes about parenting between the 
parties so as to avoid recourse to litigation, and with ensuring regular and conflict-free 
access visits.257  In some jurisdictions “special masters” are appointed by the court and 
have similar functions.258 In Ontario, however, parenting coordinators are usually 
empowered by an agreement between the parties. Like CFL, parenting coordination is 
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 useful for those who can afford it, but it is not a realm in which the provincial 
government has a direct role to play. 
 Arbitration is the form of ADR which is most similar to litigation.  In arbitration, the 
parties sign an “arbitration agreement” which empowers a third party to resolve their 
dispute.  Arbitration may or may not be preceded by a “mediation phase,” in which the 
arbitrator seeks to mediate the dispute.  If so, it is known as “mediation-arbitration,” or 
“Med-Arb.” In Ontario the Arbitration Act governs arbitrations generally.259 The Family 
Arbitration regulation, among other things, requires that those who arbitrate family 
disputes have certain types of training.  This regulation also requires all family 
arbitrations to be conducted in accordance with the law of Ontario or the law of another 
Canadian jurisdiction.260  Arbitration (with or without a prior mediation phase) offers the 
parties finality, the ability to craft an appropriate procedure for each case, and an expert 
decision-maker.261 However arbitration’s confidentiality may inhibit the development of 
the law, insofar as the decisions are not reported and cannot be used as precedents. 
Private arbitration is not available to most Ontarians due to the paucity and high fees of 
the specialist lawyers who provide this service.262   
 Nonetheless, arbitration proponents say that it is actually less costly to the 
litigants than courtroom litigation is, despite the fact that private arbitration requires the 
parties to pay the arbitrator.263  In a recent lecture, prominent Toronto arbitrator Lorne 
Wolfson identified two key reasons for this cost advantage.264  First, arbitrators are 
experts in family law, and need not be “educated” by the parties’ lawyers.  By contrast, 
some judges are generalists, and if so the parties must pay their lawyers to prepare and 
present submissions educating the judge about the applicable law.  Second, Mr. 
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 Wolfson stated that arbitrators can dedicate large chunks of time to a single case – up 
to a full day at a time.  A judge, on the other hand, can often only allocate 1 hour at a 
time to a case or settlement conference in a family law dispute.265  Because one hour is 
seldom sufficient, the parties must return weeks or months later.  Their lawyers must 
then be paid to learn the case and travel to court again. 
 If it is true that family arbitration is cheaper for the litigants than going to court, 
this might point to substantial cost savings which might be achieved through family court 
reform.  If family judges were all specialists, and if they were allowed to allocate 
longer continuous stretches of time to each case, then it is possible that the total 
number of court room hours spent per case could be dramatically reduced. This 
could, in turn, create substantial and immediate public savings.  Ontario should 
explore the possibility that features of the private family law arbitration system 
might be imitated by the public court system. 
IV. A. 4. Litigation  
 Litigation might be considered the “last line of defence” in Ontario’s response to 
the challenges arising upon intimate relationship breakdown.  Today, Ontario’s family 
and general courts administer a system of statutes and common law rules which has 
been totally re-written since the 1967 introduction of the Divorce Act.266 All Ontario 
family litigation is subject to a corpus of key statutes,267 common law principles, and 
procedural rules. 268 The Family Law Rules apply to all family disputes in all Ontario 
courts.  However, Ontario has a geographically heterogeneous family law procedure, in 
which remain substantial differences between regions and courts.  This section will 
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 briefly discuss some of the distinctive features of family litigation in Ontario, before 
identifying some of the costs and benefits of litigation as a response to family disputes. 
 There are three types of court in the system: (i) the Superior Court of Justice, (ii) 
the Ontario Court of Justice, and (iii) the Family Court branch of the Superior Court of 
Justice.269  Courts in this third category are also known as “Unified Family Courts” 
(UFC).270  In the 18 jurisdictions which have a UFC, all private family disputes can be 
addressed therein.271  In other parts of the province, litigants attend either the Superior 
Court of Justice (SCJ) or the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ).  In general, parties who 
are seeking a divorce must go to the SCJ while all others file in the OCJ.  In remote 
communities, family court may be part of a “court party” which travels between 
communities.272  Unified family courts reduce the complexity of the system for 
litigants, while allowing resources such as mediation and specialist judges to be 
deployed more efficiently for a larger group of litigants. The province should work 
with the federal government to extend the UFC system across the province. 
 Another important difference between Ontario courts is the nature of the judges.  
In some locations family matters are heard by specialist judges, who either deal 
exclusively with family law disputes or who have family law among two or three areas of 
exclusive focus.  In others, the judges are generalists who hear the whole gamut of 
legal disputes, including family law matters.  In general, smaller communities are less 
likely to have specialist family law judges, because the quantity of family disputes in 
these areas is not sufficient to occupy a judge full-time.  There is an active debate in the 
literature about whether the quality of adjudication is correlated to whether or not the 
judge is a family law specialist.273  Many family lawyers prefer specialists,274 but there 
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 does not appear to be quantifiable evidence about whether specialist judges produce 
tangibly different results for litigants.  The “Recapturing and Renewing” report proposed 
what seems a reasonable compromise position between judicial generalism and judicial 
specialism in family court: generalist judges should be appointed to hear family 
cases for terms of at least six months.275 
 There are a number of other points of divergence among Ontario family courts. 
While some jurisdictions (including Toronto) appear to have enough judges to make a 
system work in an orderly fashion,276 other jurisdictions (particularly those in the “905” 
area around Toronto) lack sufficient judicial resources to deal with the demand.277  
Judicial resources should be distributed so as to minimize regional disparities in 
access to family justice.  Parenting information sessions are mandatory in some 
courts, voluntary in others, and entirely unavailable in many others.278  There are also 
reportedly some divergences among the forms used at different courts.279  Conferences 
under Rule 17 of the Family Law Rules are scheduled in different ways at different 
courts.  For example, in Brampton a judge will have three conferences scheduled 
concurrently at 10 a.m., and shuttle between them.280  In Toronto, one conference is 
scheduled every hour or every two hours.281 
 These are all examples of regional variations and experiments in family court 
administration. They are evidence that litigation is not “monolithic” or totally tradition-
bound in the family arena. A simple form of cost-benefit analysis would involve 
comparing the costs and benefits of these alternatives which are currently in place, 
identifying best practices, and exploring potential to incorporate them elsewhere when 
appropriate.  While there may in some cases be good reasons for regional 
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 variation, family court judges and administrators should be encouraged to 
identify best practices and spread them throughout the province where 
appropriate. 
 What are the costs and benefits of litigation as a way to resolve family conflict, by 
comparison to alternatives?  While litigation is almost a dirty word among some family 
conflict, professionals, its benefits should not be ignored. Both in Ontario and abroad, 
the professionals who work in family courts have made substantial efforts to fine-tune 
civil procedure to respond to the unique characteristics of family cases.282 Litigation, 
and facilitating access to the court, may have benefits in terms in terms of access to 
justice,283 perception of justice,284 and respect for the court.285  Sometimes the 
adversarial system has produced breakthroughs. The 1992 Supreme Court of Canada 
judgment in Moge v. Moge is generally acknowledged to have constituted a major leap 
forward in Canadian spousal support law in terms of remedying support arrangements 
which were unjust to women.286  Moge, and the substantial social benefits which it has 
produced, would have been impossible if the parties had been pushed into mandatory 
mediation or another form of ADR. Had they weighed the amount of money at stake in 
their case (less than $200 per month) against the cost of litigating through multiple 
appeals to the highest court in the land, then it is unlikely that our law would have 
moved forward as it did.287   
 Some scholars say that people feel more satisfied with adversarial modes of 
dispute resolution as compared to inquisitorial or mediatory ones.288 Carol Smart and 
Vanessa May note that, at least in principle, “the courts can … function as a mechanism 
through which the parents can express their hurt and grievances, and in this way the 
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 legal process can offer psychological containment of  disputes and conflict.”289 
However, family litigation appears to many of the litigants to be unfair. The OCLN 
telephone survey found that, among low- and middle-income Ontarians who had 
resolved a family dispute within the previous three years, 45.7% said the process was 
“unfair.”290  This suggests that the status quo, despite its emphasis on due process, is 
not convincing Ontarians that justice is being done.   
 One genuine benefit of litigation as a dispute-resolution mechanism is its 
openness to public scrutiny.  Trials are transcribed, decisions are reported, and appeals 
are available to the litigants. None of the forms of ADR described above possess all of 
these characteristics.  To the extent that we are concerned about decisions being made 
on inappropriate grounds (e.g. gender bias), the openness of litigation may be 
preferable to the secrecy of ADR. 
 Despite these benefits, family litigation imposes very substantial costs on adults, 
children, and society. The most obvious costs of family litigation for adults are the time 
and money which it consumes. The average 2009 legal fee for a contested divorce in 
Ontario was $12,602.291  A divorce may be “contested” even if it is settled fairly quickly, 
and divorces involving courtroom advocacy can cost much more.  The average legal fee 
for all Ontario civil litigation cases culminating in two-day civil trials was $45,477.292  
While it is not clearly specified in this data source, it appears probable that these fees 
are per person. The average “per family” legal fee for a contested divorce would 
therefore be 2 x $12,602, or $25,204.  Retaining other private sector professionals, such 
as mediators or assessors adds to the cost,293 unless doing so reduces the need for 
lawyers. 
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  How affordable are family lawyers’ fees for Ontarians?  These fees might be paid 
for by borrowing, by drawing on savings, or from individual income.  As noted above,294 
there is a long-term trend to higher levels of indebtedness and lower quantities of 
savings. Even if an Ontarian is able to borrow or use savings in order to pay, doing so 
will clearly have obvious long-term repercussions on his or her economic well-being.  
Savings spent in litigation cannot be used for retirement or education, and loans must 
eventually be repaid. 
 To what extent can the average Ontarian pay for family litigation using his or her 
income, without drawing down savings or borrowing?  The most recent data on 
Ontarians’ incomes from Statistics Canada pertains to 2007.  That data indicates that 
the median income for “Economic families, two persons or more” in Ontario was 
$67,500.295  Projecting the 1998-2007 income growth trend forwards produces a 
projected median income of $68,845 for 2009.296  The 2009 “per family” legal fee for a 
contested divorce ($25,204) is equal to 36.6% of this income.  Given that the average 
Canadian household saved only $3,200 in 2009,297 it is clear that there is little surplus 
available in the average household budget to pay sudden and dramatic expenses such 
as legal fees. 
 It is safe to conclude that the average legal fee for a contested divorce would 
constitute an enormous financial blow for the average family. Moreover, these costs 
come at a time when people are likely to be especially ill-equipped to pay them, given 
the other financial pressures which are likely to arise on relationship breakdown, such 
as the need to relocate.  This is particularly true for a spouse who left or curtailed 
involvement in workforce during the relationship.298   
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  Each family lawyer’s bill will likely be paid by a single individual, given that the 
family relationship has broken down.  Comparing the average legal bills against the 
incomes of median “lone-parent families” and “unattached individuals” establishes the 
inaccessibility of family legal services to middle-class Ontarians even more dramatically. 
The average 2009 legal fee for a contested divorce in Ontario ($12,602) is equal to 58% 
and 40% of the projected median 2009 incomes for unattached individuals and lone-
parent families, respectively. 
 Nor are the lawyers’ fees the only financial expense.  The following finding is 
from the Ontario Civil Legal Needs project, which conducted focus groups with justice 
system workers:  
In addition to actual legal costs, the focus group participants pointed out 
a number of associated costs of accessing services that their clientele 
were not generally aware of and therefore not prepared for. Among 
these costs were those related to transportation, obtaining 
documentation, trial costs outside of the lawyer’s services (such as 
expert witness fees), and childcare costs (as childcare would sometimes 
be needed to enable a client to attend hearings and trials).299 
 Family litigation also has a very substantial cost in time.  In some jurisdictions, 
litigants must return to court many times before their matter is called, due to insufficient 
judicial resources.  In 2007 the Toronto Star told the story of Siddika Sumar, who spent 
$256,963.13  in legal fees spent on her family law case between 2004 and 2007. On 11 
occasions, she attended the Newmarket court with her lawyer, only to find that there 
was no judge available or that the matter had been adjourned.300  Newmarket is known 
as a particularly overburdened family court, and this story is by no means representative 
of all Ontarians’ experience. The particular problems faced by family courts in the “905 
belt” around Toronto may help explain the OCLN telephone survey finding that residents 
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 of the “Outer GTA” [Greater Toronto Area] were among those whose family relationship 
legal problems had persisted for the longest periods of time without resolution.301” 
 However, even in the smoothest-running family courts, substantial time is 
required to prepare and attend.  For many, this means seeking time away from work, 
arranging day care, etc.  It has been estimated that the majority of all Ontario family 
litigants are unrepresented by lawyers.302  For these individuals the cost in money is 
reduced but the cost in personal time and stress must surely be increased. An hour 
which a citizen spends in, or preparing for, a family court appearance is an hour which 
cannot be spent contributing to Ontario’s society or economy.  For example, in the 
access dispute Geremia v. Harb, the father was self-represented during the majority of 
the litigation.303  At the end, he claimed $155,688.53 in costs, arriving at this figure by 
multiplying the hours he had spent on his case by a notional rate of $110 per hour.  If 
accurate, this would suggest that he spent in excess of 1400 hours preparing for this 
case.  Had he spent 1400 hours working as an electrician (his profession), the benefit to 
Ontario in income taxes alone would have been substantial. While this claim was 
probably extreme and was not allowed by the court, it provides some indication of the 
cost in time of family litigation. 
  The costs of litigation are paid directly by adults, but they are also paid indirectly 
by the children of these adults.  Parenting requires time, money, and energy, and family 
litigation can easily consume these scarce resources to the extent that it impairs 
parenting.304 Julie Lassonde conducted a round-table consultation with children who 
had experienced challenges related to parental separation, and found substantial 
awareness of the price of litigation and its impact on the family’s financial security.305  
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 Occasionally, children are involved directly in family litigation.306  There is a debate 
about the impact of litigation-involvement on children, but at least in some cases it can 
be traumatic.307  This is especially true if children are asked to choose or take sides as 
between their parents, and inexperienced judges or lawyers may do so.308 Assessment 
by a mental health professional or social worker is a much more common form of child 
involvement in family litigation,309 but some say that this too can be stressful for 
children.310  Children also pay a cost of family litigation because litigation increases 
inter-parental hostility, 311 which has been clearly demonstrated in the literature to have 
negative effects on children.312  
 Family litigation also has substantial costs for society and the taxpayer. The most 
obvious and direct costs to society of family litigation are those involved in paying 
judges and other court personnel and in operating court rooms. Most judges of the 
Ontario Court of Justice were paid a salary of $245,422.45 plus taxable benefits of 
$3,659.35, for a total taxable remuneration of $249,081.80.313 Remuneration of 
Superior Court of Justice judges is established by the federal Judges Act, which 
established a 2004 salary and a series of cost-of-living adjustments.314  According to 
the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (established under s. 26(1) of the 
Judges Act) the annual salary earned by these judges in 2009 was approximately 
$260,064.315 
  While some of these costs are inevitable, there is an argument to be made that 
counterproductive processes increase these direct costs to the taxpayer. The costs of 
dysfunctional family litigation borne by adults and children are also costs borne by 
society as a whole. Social and economic benefits may therefore result from reform 
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 efforts which reduce dysfunctional conflict.  Preventative efforts to reduce family 
litigation are likely to save more money than they cost.  Given its dramatic cost in 
money, time, and stress, litigation should be society’s last resort in responding to 
family conflict. 
IV. B. Administrative and non-individualized responses to private support 
entitlements  
 This section will survey the present reality and potential future application of 
administrative solutions to family support obligations in Ontario.  The adjective 
“administrative” is used here to refer to the resolution of disputes and enforcement of 
obligations by state agencies which are not courts, and by state employees who are not 
judges.316  This Part will first review the law of child support with emphasis on the 
elements which may make it suitable for administrative solutions.  It will then identify 
administrative responses to family disputes which have already been implemented in 
Ontario and elsewhere.  The author will then argue that, at least with regard to guideline 
child support, administrative solutions could have substantial benefits in increased 
compliance and reduced process costs for parties and the state.  The costs or 
drawbacks of such reforms would come in the form reduced potential for discretionary 
and customized judicial decision-making.  
IV. B. 1. Guideline Child Support 
 The two primary support obligations in Canadian family law are child support and 
spousal support. Spousal support has been made more predictable by the creation of 
the  Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines,317 and could conceivably be  subject to 
administrative solutions.  However child support, and especially “guideline” child 
support, is the family law remedy which lends itself most obviously to administrative 
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 responses. “Guideline” child support is the amount payable according to section 3 of the 
Child Support Guidelines (CSG).318  The CSG require only two inputs in most cases: (i) 
individual income of the payor, and (ii) the number of children for whom child support is 
to be paid. Using these inputs, the amount owing is provided by a series of tables which 
are part of the legislation. 
 Of course, Canadian child support law is more complex than simply the 
calculation of Guideline amounts.  In some cases, support must be calculated in a more 
discretionary fashion – e.g. if custody is shared or if the payor’s income is in excess of 
$150,000 per year.319  Even if the Guideline  amount is payable, additional amounts 
may also be owed for “special expenses.320”  Determining the payor’s income can in 
some cases be complex, especially if the payor is self-employed.321 However in the 
substantial majority of cases, once payor income and number of children are known 
there is a readily calculated guideline amount which will be owing. There is, in these 
cases, relatively little need for sophisticated or individualized decision-making about the 
Guideline support obligation. It is for this reason that Ontario family court judges can 
and do make guideline child support orders at pre-trial conferences, in the absence of 
full argument and record.322  It is also for this reason that guideline child support is an 
area of our family law in which moving away from a judicial model towards an 
administrative model should be considered. 
IV. B. 2. Status quo in Ontario 
 In Ontario, the court system retains primary responsibility for determining support 
obligations.  However, some movement towards an administrative model has already 
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 taken place.  This is most obviously true with regard to support enforcement, but is also 
somewhat true with regard to determination and recalculation of support obligations.  
 The most prominent administrative element of family support procedure in 
Ontario is the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).323  A part of the provincial 
government’s Ministry of Community and Social Services, FRO describes its work as 
“help[ing] people meet their child and spousal support responsibilities.”324 These 
responsibilities include support obligations created by domestic contracts and paternity 
agreements which have been filed with a court,325 in addition to support orders made by 
a judge.326  FRO enforces support orders using powers assigned by the Family 
Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.327  For example, FRO has the 
power to suspend the driver’s license of a payor who is in default,328 or seize his or her 
property.329  However FRO states that in most cases, the amount owing is simply 
forwarded by the payor’s employer to FRO.330  The agency then sends this money to 
the support recipient. 
 A secondary administrative support enforcement initiative of the Ontario 
government is www.goodparentspay.com.331  Visitors to this website are invited to “help 
Ontario children and families by helping us find missing, irresponsible parents who have 
defaulted on the payments owed to their kids.” When accessed on June 21, 2010, this 
website contained 39 photographs and physical description of support debtors.  The 
website asks members of the public to send information about these individuals and 
their whereabouts to the Family Responsibility Office.  The Family Responsibility Office 
and Good Parents Pay are administrative approaches to support enforcement.  The 
Family Law Act also allows provincial agencies granting social assistance to enforce 
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 child support entitlements of recipients,332 which could arguably be considered another 
administrative approach to support enforcement. 
 Enforcement is only one element of the law of support.  With regard to the initial 
determination and recalculation of child support, the Ontario court system has remained 
in the driver’s seat. However, this may be on the verge of changing.  The following as-
yet-unproclaimed provisions were added to Ontario’s Family Law Act in late 2009: 
Recalculation of child support 
39.1  (1)  The amount payable for the support of a child under an order 
may be recalculated in accordance with this Act and the regulations 
made under this Act, by the child support service established by the 
regulations, in order to reflect updated income information.  
Effect of recalculation 
(2)  Subject to any review or appeal process established by the 
regulations made under this Act, if the child support service recalculates 
an amount payable for the support of a child under an order, the 
recalculated amount is, 31 days after the date on which the parties to 
the order are notified of the recalculation in accordance with the 
regulations, deemed to be the amount payable under the order.333  
These provisions appear to envision an administrative “child support service” which 
could be responsible for recalculating child support in light of payor income changes.  
However these remain unproclaimed as of June 21, 2010 and the regulations to which 
they refer have not been made public.  
IV. B. 3. Status Quo in Other Provinces 
 All of Canada’s provinces have Maintenance Enforcement Programs (MEPs) 
analogous to Ontario’s FRO; these were created in the 1980s and 1990s.334  The 
essential functions of MEPs are (i) registration of cases; (ii) processing of payments; (iii) 
monitoring, and (iv) enforcement.335  Roughly one third of all Canadian family law cases 
in which child support is owed are enrolled with a MEP.336  In the West and North of 
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 Canada, the MEP programs are run on “opt-in” basis: the recipient can choose whether 
to enrol. In the remainder of the country, they are generally “opt-out:” all support orders 
are enrolled and recipients and payors can only remove themselves under specified 
conditions.337  
 While enforcement is the element of support law in which administrative solutions 
are most widespread in Canada, recalculation is also the subject of several recent 
administrative initiatives. As noted above, any change in payor income is likely to 
constitute grounds for upward or downward revision.  Because few people have 
incomes which are totally constant from year to year, many payors and recipients are 
legally entitled to seek a variation. 
 The Divorce Act permits the federal government to enter an agreement with a 
province “authorizing a provincial child support service designated in the agreement to 
… recalculate, at regular intervals, in accordance with the applicable guidelines, the 
amount of child support orders on the basis of updated income information.”338  Several 
such provincial child support services have been established.  According to a federal 
Department of Justice survey conducted in March of 2008, they exist in Prince Edward 
Island, Manitoba, British Columbia, and Newfoundland.339  Another was subsequently 
launched in Alberta,340 and such programs may exist in other provinces as well. 
 Newfoundland was the first Canadian province to initiate an administrative child 
support recalculation service under an agreement with Ottawa. This initiative began with 
the “Family Justice Services Western” pilot project, which was established in the 
communities of Corner Brook and Stephenville in 2002.  It provided an expansive set of 
services to individuals with family problems, including mediation, education, and 
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 counselling.341  However, perhaps the most dramatic innovation was the administrative 
child support recalculation service.  An amendment to provincial legislation allowed 
provincial employees to recalculate child support obligations after changes in payor 
incomes, subject to only minimal judicial oversight.342   
 A report prepared for the federal Department of Justice in 2004 evaluated this 
pilot project.343  This evaluation document sought to identify the costs, as well as the 
benefits, of introducing such services on a broader basis.  However, section 2.8 of the 
report identified a divergence between the nominal budget of the pilot project 
($489,460) and the “real cost,” due to the project’s reliance on in-kind contributions from 
the provincial government and due to an unsustainably low salary for one of the 
employees.344  The document also identified some non-financial costs or drawbacks. 
For example, it identified (without quantifying) the danger of court-annexed mediation in 
situations of domestic violence or power imbalance.345  However, the overall evaluation 
was positive. 
 Administrative schemes do not yet appear to exist which handle the initial 
determination of child support, as opposed to the subsequent recalculation or 
enforcement of a support obligation.  Section 25.1 of the Divorce Act suggests that 
while provincial child support services may perform the entire function of recalculation 
based on income changes by themselves, with regard to the initial determination of child 
support entitlements they may only “assist courts.”346  As of March of 2008, the 
Department of Justice had not identified any administrative “Support Establishment 
Services.” However, several provinces have special legal aid or mediation programs for 
initial establishment of support.347   
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  In Québec, the state has a somewhat more active role in child support collection 
and enforcement. All child support payments are made to the Minister of Revenue 
unless an exemption has been granted.348  If the support debtor is in arrears, the 
Minister may also in some cases provide advances of money to the support creditor.  
These advances are limited to a maximum dollar amount of $1,000 and may not 
continue for more than three months.349  One impediment to implementing this system 
in Ontario is that this province, unlike Québec, does not have its own Ministry of 
Revenue. That task is performed on Ontario’s behalf by the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA), and section IV.B.7 will consider a possible role for the CRA in family support 
administration.  Alternatively, FRO could perform a similar function, by providing a 
steady stream of child support benefits to recipients in the event of fluctuations 
in the amount collected.  The amounts forwarded to recipients by FRO could 
subsequently be collected from payors with interest. 
IV. B. 4. Benefits of Administrative Solutions  
 Increased Compliance and Durability. With regard to child and spousal support 
obligations, compliance is a substantial challenge,350 and increased reliance on 
administrative techniques may be part of the solution. In 1979, the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada estimated that “some degree of default” occurs in “as many as 
75 per cent of all orders" of this nature.351  There is also some information about 
compliance available from provincial Maintenance Enforcement Programs such as 
FRO. In one sample of MEPs studied by Statistics Canada, only one third of the 
recipients enrolled received the full amount owing in every month of a given year.352  
Another Statistics Canada document reported that roughly 68% of cases enrolled in a 
 72
 MEP are in full compliance in any given month.353  Ontario’s Provincial Auditor reported 
in 2005 that “payment arrears totalled approximately $1.3 billion,” and “approximately 
23,000 support recipients, whose cases were in arrears totalling over $200 million in 
2003, were receiving provincial social assistance.”354 
 However, many support agreements are not registered with a MEP, and it is 
difficult or impossible to determine the compliance rate among these.  A substantial 
methodological problem is posed by the large number of cases which are never subject 
to any formal adjudication. If two parents separate and reach a “kitchen table” 
agreement about child support without involving the legal system, how is a researcher 
to know whether those child support obligations were fulfilled? 
 Paul Millar responded to this challenge with an innovative empirical technique in 
his 2009 book.355 Millar used the Statistics Canada Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics data set in order to study support payments in Canada.356  This survey asked 
respondents questions about how much they paid and/or received in child and spousal 
support every month, as part of a general questionnaire about income.357 Child support 
is directly tied to the payor’s income in most cases, and while spousal support is more 
complex it is also correlated to payor income.  One would therefore expect that support 
payments would change roughly as often as payor incomes do.  However Millar found 
that income fluctuates much more often and more dramatically than support payments.  
Millar elaborates on his findings: 
The fraction of household income, particularly for support payors, is 
much lower than would be expected awards dictated by the Canadian 
child support guidelines.  The finding supports the contention that child 
support is drifting away – on average, lower – from the guidelines as 
time passes, accounting for the lower than expected amounts of child 
support as proportion of payors’ income.358 
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  A key benefit of administrative initiatives in family support law is their potential to 
increase compliance.  Indeed, this is the primary purpose of the maintenance 
enforcement programs schemes which represent the most substantial administrative 
initiatives in Canadian family law.359  The deduction of support at source (e.g. by the 
employer of the support obligor) removes many of the opportunities for non-payment.  
The expansion of administrative initiatives, for example into the initial establishment and 
subsequent recalculation of support obligations, might further increase the number of 
parents who receive the amounts to which they are entitled by law. It could also bring 
relief for the payors who have suffered involuntary decreases in income and are 
therefore entitled to reductions in the obligation.  For these among other reasons, Paul 
Millar suggests that an administrative agencies should perhaps play a stronger role in 
child support recalculation.360 
 Reduced Process Costs for the Parties. Using litigation to determine and enforce 
guideline child support involves substantial process costs for the parties.361  Parents, 
especially single parents, are already under substantial time and financial stress.  
Having to go to court may therefore be especially burdensome for them.  Administrative 
initiatives have the potential to reduce the process costs on parents who receive or pay 
child support.  Shelley Kierstead describes administration recalculation schemes as the 
“ideal manner by which to foster greater certainty and relieve recipient parents of the 
potentially daunting burden of initiating negotiations for revised support obligations with 
a former partner.”362  The benefits which Kierstead identifies would also be enjoyed by 
payors who experience involuntary drops in income.363 
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 IV. B. 5. Costs and Drawbacks of Administrative Solutions 
 Lack of individualized legal advice and help. The first significant drawback is that 
administrative regimes are not likely to offer parties the individualized advice and 
support which a capable lawyer can provide.  This reality is illustrated by the Family 
Responsibility Office’s treatment of “Mr. F,” which was the subject of a 2006 report from 
the Ombudsman of Ontario, André Marin.364  FRO had issued a Writ of Seizure and 
Sale against a home belonging to F’s former spouse.  However, the Writ was issued in 
the debtor’s former name, instead of her new married name.  Because the home was 
registered under the debtor’s new name, the Writ was ineffectual. The Ombudsman 
chastised FRO for not informing Mr. F of the potential need to vary the support order so 
as to reflect the debtor’s new name.365 The Director of FRO replied that this office,  
as a neutral maintenance enforcement program enforcing support 
orders in Ontario, is unable to provide legal advice to either a support 
payor or a support recipient.366  
While the Ombudsman found this explanation unconvincing,367 there are good reasons 
why administrative agencies must be cautious about giving legal advice to individuals. 
To do so can expose them to liability insofar as they lack the resources and statutory 
mandate to competently offer legal advice.  The reality is that parties are unlikely to 
receive compassionate and individualized service from an administrative agency such 
as FRO or the Canada Revenue Agency.  This is not necessary the consequence of 
incompetence or wrong-doing on the part of the agency; it is simply a reflection of the 
nature of government agencies. Personalized and emotionally responsive service is 
more likely to come from a lawyer or paralegal who is directly retained by the client. 
 The Disempowering Effects of Bureaucracy. Second, working with an 
administrative agency may also be more disempowering than working with an individual 
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 legal service provider.  Lawyers are, at least in principle, responsible to and directed by 
their clients.  By contrast, Marin characterized the relationship between Mr. F and the 
FRO as “one of power and dependency,” with the agency in the driver’s seat. Marin 
noted that s. 6(7) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act  
(the statute which empowers FRO) prevents the parties themselves from initiating 
enforcement actions once the order has been filed with FRO. He therefore concluded 
that FRO “has the legal duty to enforce support arrangements, the discretion to use a 
range of tools to do so, and imposing powers.  Meanwhile, the ‘support recipients’ … 
have their enforcement rights and interests left entirely in the hands of that Office.”368   
 Inefficiency and Ineffectiveness of Administrative Agencies. Third, it should not 
be assumed that an administrative agency will discharge its assigned functions in an 
efficient and effective manner, even when those functions appear to be straightforward 
and the agency’s powers appear to be plenary.  As the status quo compliance figures 
indicate, the provinces’ Maintenance Enforcement Programs described above are by no 
means completely successful in securing support payment.369 The Provincial Auditor of 
Ontario sharply criticized FRO in 2003 for its lack of effectiveness:  
We concluded that the Family Responsibility Office did not have 
satisfactory systems and procedures in place for initiating contact and 
taking appropriate and timely enforcement action where payers were in 
arrears on their family-support obligations. In fact, it is our view that, 
unless the Office takes aggressive enforcement action, supported by 
effective case management and significantly improved information 
technology and communications systems, it is in grave danger of failing 
to meet its mandated responsibilities. We found that the Office’s 
services were impaired…370 
 A 2005 follow-up by the same office found that “some progress has been made 
in implementing the recommendations, but “further progress on several 
recommendations depends on the successful implementation of a new case 
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 management system."371 While there are tens of thousands of Ontarians in arrears on 
child support, Good Parents Pay has only 39 profiles publicly available.  Clearly, 
whatever impact this administrative initiative has can only be a “drop in the bucket.”  
 Other potential costs or drawbacks of administrative initiatives should also be 
recognized.  Removing an area of the law from the domain of the courts may diminish 
the ability of the common law to develop along with society.372  Especially in the 
absence of effective judicial review, administrative agencies may abrogate the rights of 
citizens in an irresponsible or authoritarian fashion. 
   Finally, family courts can offer “one-stop-shopping” to Ontarians. Property 
division and parenting disputes may be resolved along with support issues in a single 
process.  If those family disputes which are most amenable to administrative decision-
making (i.e., guideline child support) were to be handled by a separate agency, 
Ontarians might have to engage in two or more separate processes to resolve their 
family challenges.  This duplication of processes would entail substantial additional 
process costs.  As Ontario explores the potential of administrative responses to 
family challenges, it should seek to maximize their benefits (increased 
compliance and potentially reduced process costs), while reducing their costs 
(such as citizen disempowerment, bureaucratic inefficiency).  
IV. B. 6. The potential role of the Canada Revenue Agency 
 Among the numerous ways in which administrative decision-making in family law 
could be expanded, one of the more dramatic and comprehensive would be involving 
the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in child support determination, recalculation, 
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 collection and payment. In Quebec, the Minister of Revenue is actively involved in child 
support collection and payment, and this model could be expanded across the country. 
 There are several potential advantages to this idea.  As noted above, 
determining the income of self-employed individuals is one of the thorniest challenges in 
child support law. The CRA is already in the business of precisely determining individual 
income, in order to assess income tax owing.  There might be significant efficiencies in 
allocating the task of income-determination for child support purposes to the CRA as 
well. With regard to enforcement, the CRA also has the legal powers and the expertise 
to collect income tax which is in arrears.  These powers might equally be used to collect 
child support.  Finally, the CRA already has some involvement in family disputes, e.g. 
under the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act.373 
 However, giving responsibility for child support to the CRA would certainly 
involve that agency in matters with which it has no experience or institutional expertise.  
For example, the determination of biological parentage involves genetic testing of 
individuals and the application of legal presumptions.  There are also discretionary 
elements of child support which call for individualized decision-making.374  Finally, there 
are constitutional and political impediments to having the CRA involved in child support, 
which might or might not be overcome.375  The province should explore and discuss 
with the federal government the potential of involving the CRA in family support 
administration.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 In applying cost-benefit analysis to post-relationship family challenges, this paper 
has asked three questions which are perhaps more familiar in public health than in legal 
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discourse.  First, why does the unhealthy condition in question arise?  Second, how can 
the condition, or its worst symptoms, be prevented before they arise?  Third, given that 
prevention will not be fully successful, how should we respond to or treat the problem  
when and to the extent that it arises within the population?   
 Each potential response to family challenges has its own constellation of costs 
and benefits. Only some of these costs and benefits are capable of quantification and 
comparison.  This paper has sought to identify reforms which seem to have benefits in 
excess of their costs.  Harmonious with the findings of the Law Commission’s public 
consultations, many of these proposals involve moving the point of public intervention 
earlier in the lifespan of the family, or earlier in the lifespan of the conflict.  The Law 
Commission may conclude that, in Ontario’s response to post-separation family 
challenges, an ounce of prevention is indeed worth a pound of cure.  
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